Changes in Water Allocation Mechanisms for California Agriculture

Zilberman, David; MacDougall, Neal; Shah, Farhed A.

doi:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1994.tb00418.x

Cited by 39 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 4 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Such institutions have the capacity to rationalize water scarcity, both qualitatively and quantitatively. The potential promotion of efficiency from the creation of market institutions is well documented (Anderson and Hill, 1997;Zilberman et al, 1994). Once tradable permits are allocated, they can be traded subject to a set of prescribed rules.…”

Section: U N C O R R E C T E D P R O O Fmentioning

confidence: 99%

Current Issues in the Economics of Groundwater Resource Management

Koundouri

2004

Journal of Economic Surveys

182

125

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. The issue of groundwater management remains a practical concern in many regions throughout the world, while water managers continue to grapple with the question of how to manage this resource. In this article, we attempt to bring the most advanced and appropriate tools to bear on the issue of resource allocation involving groundwater. Our objective is to demonstrate the state of the art in the literature on ways to think about this complex resource and to deal with the important economic issues emanating from its complexity. We present the conceptual framework within which economists examine the elements interacting in the management of groundwater resources, indicate why the role of the market is limited with respect to the price of this very complex resource, and point to the mechanisms that can pull competitive groundwater price and quality-graded quantity of groundwater in line with their equilibrium levels. In particular, we critically review economic models of groundwater use, examine the potential for groundwater management, discuss the difficulties encountered in the estimation of the relevant control variables of such models, and identify the advantages and limitations of the instruments devised for the efficient use (allocation) of this resource. Finally, we argue that devised regulatory schemes usually ignore the information and knowledge needed for their implementation, and we suggest a core of conditions necessary for successful groundwater management reforms.

show abstract

Section: U N C O R R E C T E D P R O O Fmentioning

confidence: 99%

Current Issues in the Economics of Groundwater Resource Management

Koundouri

2004

Journal of Economic Surveys

182

125

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Firstly, it can reveal information that would otherwise be unavailable to the policy maker, thus removing or reducing information deficiencies. In Australian water resource management there is a relative dearth of information about riverine systems and our knowledge about the complex 'production functions' that underpin environmental amenity is largely incomplete (see, for instance, DLWC 1999; Zilberman, MacDougall and Shah 1997). Indeed, little is known of the community's preferences for environmental improvements and the unpleasant trade-offs that the community is prepared to accept to achieve them.…”

Section: Benefits Of Community Consultationmentioning

confidence: 97%

Community consultation in public policy: The case of the Murray-Darling Basin of Australia

Crase

Dollery²,

Wallis

2005

Australian Journal of Political Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…Quadratic functions are commonly used to evaluate the relationships between the value of crop production and water use in the literature (Zilberman et al 1994, Qureshi et al 2007). Water benefit functions were developed for each water user site by regressing the total regional crop production benefits with total water withdrawals between 1980 and 2000 using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method (Greene 2003): (2) where is water use per hectare, is irrigation benefit per hectare, and , , and are the parameters of the benefit function.…”

Section: Key Model Equationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Market-Based Water Allocation Can Improve Water Use Efficiency in the Aral Sea Basin?

Bekchanov¹,

Bhaduri

Ringler

2013

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in ABSTRACTIncreasing water demand due to population growth and economic development under the mounted investment costs for developing new water sources calls for efficient, equitable and sustainable management of water resources in many developing countries. This is more essential in the Aral Sea basin where the tremendous development in irrigation since the 1960s combined with unbalanced water resources management led to the destruction of the ecosystems in the delta zone and the gradual desiccation of the Aral Sea, once the fourth biggest lake of the world with a surface area of 68,000 km 2 and total water volume of 1,100 km 3 . Disintegration of the Central Asian states after the collapse of the Soviet Union also increased the tensions among up-and downstream users over sharing water resources. Insufficient investments in irrigation infrastructure, lack of economic incentives to adopt water-wise approaches, and inefficient water governance and institutions have been the main reasons of decreased water use efficiency in the post-Soviet period.Market-based water allocation is tested to deal with aggravating water conflicts in the Aral Sea basin. Aggregated integrated hydro-economic model is constructed to analyze the water market mechanism as an alternative option to the traditional administrative water allocation. Water users are allowed to trading their water use rights and increasing their benefits under this decentralized water management system. The analyses show the availability of additional gains amounted to US$ 373 to 476 million under inter-catchment water trading depending on the level of water availability. Similarly, additional gains of US$ 259 to 339 million are estimated under intra-catchment water trading. Furthermore, increased trend of additional gains from water trading along with decreased water availability are found. However, transaction costs of introducing tradable water rights are essential to judge the effectiveness of water market reforms and initiate appropriate institutional changes. According to our estimations, transaction costs of more than 5 ¢/m 3 of traded water use rights eliminate the potential benefits of the water trading option. Friendly relationships among the riparian countries and infrastructural improvements are suggested as a means of developing low cost enforcement of water trading contracts.

show abstract

Changes in Water Allocation Mechanisms for California Agriculture

Cited by 39 publications

References 4 publications

Current Issues in the Economics of Groundwater Resource Management

Current Issues in the Economics of Groundwater Resource Management

Community consultation in public policy: The case of the Murray-Darling Basin of Australia

How Market-Based Water Allocation Can Improve Water Use Efficiency in the Aral Sea Basin?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About