Chaotic shop-talk or efficient parliament? The Reichstag, the parties, and the problem of governmental instability in the Weimar Republic

Abstract

The German parliament in the Weimar Republic was very instable and governments did not last long. Historical research has tried to determine what caused this instability. Those historical hypotheses are re-examined by studying a completely new dataset covering 489 roll-call-bills in the parliament during the 14 years in question. According to the findings of this study it is very unlikely that it was only the system, its conditions and its actors that caused instability and that the reasons rather have to be found outside parliament.

The behaviour of political parties and MPs in the parliaments of the Weimar Republic

“…Jones, 1972Jones, , 2009Schönhoven, 2002) and political science (e.g. Berg-Schlosser, 1995;Berman, 1997;Lehmann, 2009;Lieberman, 1998;Loewenberg, 1971). Studies have covered a wide range of topics, ranging from the elections, the political culture and the rise of national socialism to the various reasons behind the demise of the Republic.…”

Representation of Women in the Parliament of the Weimar Republic: Evidence from Roll Call Votes

“…Using roll-call votes for the analysis of parliamentary behavior is not novel; for studies of the United States Congress, this approach has been the norm for at least the last 20 years (see also Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Studies of roll-call votes in the Weimar Republic have also recently been undertaken by Debus and Hansen (2010), Hansen and Debus (2012), and Lehmann (2010). While there are benefits of using roll-call votes, how they are requested and how representative they are warrants a short discussion of how and when roll calls can be implemented (see also Saalfeld 1995).…”

“…This approach has primarily been the terrain of historians, although in recent years an increasing number of studies in political science has also sought out to test theories on historical data (e.g. Aleman and Saiegh 2012;Debus and Hansen, 2010;Debus, 2012, Schonhardt-Bailey, 2003;Berman, 1997;Lehmann, 2010). It also follows part of the suggestion by Beckwith (2007) on creating longitudinal studies to examine what happens when the number of female representatives grows over time.…”

“…In examining whether women legislators pursue a particular representative function, we argue that we should focus on their behavior close to the time point when they were granted the right to become political representatives and to analyze their behavior within the context of that time period. This approach has primarily been the terrain of historians, although in recent years an increasing number of studies in political science has also sought to test theories on historical data (e.g., Aleman and Saiegh 2012; Berman 1997; Debus and Hansen 2010; Hansen and Debus 2012; Lehmann 2010; Schonhardt-Bailey 2003). It also follows part of the suggestion by Beckwith (2007) on creating longitudinal studies to examine what happens when the number of female representatives grows over time.…”

The Political Economy of the Prussian Three-Class Franchise

“…8 Debus and Hansen (2014) use several Weimar Republic roll calls to study the voting behavior of women in parliament. Lehmann (2010a) tax, and business tax): the upper tercile of tax payments had as many votes as the middle tercile and the lower tercile. On average, first-class voters had about 17.5 times the number of votes of third-class voters, even stronger inequality at the local ward (Urwahlbezirk) level.…”