Chapter 10 Dimensions of event perception

Shaw, Robert E.; Flascher, Oded M.; Mace, William M.

doi:10.1016/s1874-5822(96)80013-2

Cited by 9 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 85 publications

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“…In the dynamic task, each black circle had an 800ms duration and was separated from the appearance of the next black circle by a 30ms interstimulus-interval (ISI). This is within the range of ISIs typically shown to elicit a percept of apparent motion (Shaw, Flascher & Mace, 1995). A path length of 'five' targets was chosen to fall within, but not exceed, VWM capacity (Cowan, 2010) and to allow the same patterns to be presented in the dynamic and static conditions (larger path sizes would require repetition across blocks which cannot be represented effectively in the static task).…”

Section: Materials and Equipmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Recognition of dance-like actions: Memory for static posture or dynamic movement?

et al. 2014

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Section: Materials and Equipmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Recognition of dance-like actions: Memory for static posture or dynamic movement?

et al. 2014

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“…It is in terms of events that the radical strategy for resolving the two muddles is best appreciated. Shaw, Flascher, and Mace (1996) suggested the following preliminary definition:…”

Section: The Radical Consequence Of Resolving the Two Muddlesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Muddle of Anticipation

Stepp

Turvey

2015

Ecological Psychology

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In J. J. Gibson's classic paper "The Problem of Temporal Order in Stimulation and Perception" (1966a), he referred to the difficulties encountered when attempting a sharp distinction between memory and perception as "the muddle of memory." Resolution of the muddle by J. J. Gibson proceeded by blurring the distinction itself. We develop the conjugate "muddle of anticipation" similarly by blurring the sharp distinction traditionally drawn between anticipation and perception. The subsequent redefinition of the problem is grounded in strong anticipation equated with anticipating synchronization-that which arises from a system itself via lawful regularities embedded in the system's ordinary mode of function. We identify the fit of strong anticipation's properties to J. J. Gibson's ecological approach and in so doing introduce the possibility of a potentially deep connection between them, namely, that the coordination of perception with surroundings (direct perception) is a special case of strong anticipation. TWO MUDDLESJ. J. Gibson (1966a) wrote about the "muddle of memory," referring to the difficulty of defining memory in any way other than through introspection, which

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“…As such we can draw a distinction between structural or transformational invariants (Michaels & Carello 1981;Bartlett 1984;Shaw et al, 1996): structural invariants refer to features that are not or only slowly changing, transformational invariants refer to styles of change (Shaw & Pittenger 1978). Both of them underlie the perception of events which can be defined in operational terms as ''something happening to something'', with the ''something happening'' being specified by transformational and the ''something'' to which something is happening by structural invariants (Michaels & Carello 1981, p. 26).…”

Section: Structural and Transformational Invariantsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It can be described in a propositional way by specifying an event (E) perceptually when both the transformational (TI) and the structural invariant (SI) are available to be detected. An event, then, can be specified when the twovariable function E(TI, SI) can be evaluated (Shaw et al 1996). To give an example: an event involving a bouncing ball might be denoted as E(TI 1/4 bouncing, SI 1/4 ball) 1/4 bouncing ball.…”

Section: Categorical and Auditory Perceptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Biosemiotic and Ecological Approach to Music Cognition: Event Perception Between Auditory Listening and Cognitive Economy

Reybrouck¹

2005

Axiomathes

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ABSTRACT. This paper addresses the question whether we can conceive of music cognition in ecosemiotic terms. It claims that music knowledge must be generated as a tool for adaptation to the sonic world and calls forth a shift from a structural description of music as an artifact to a process-like approach to dealing with music. As listeners, we are observers who construct and organize our knowledge and bring with us our observational tools. What matters is not merely the sonic world in its objective qualities, but the world as perceived. In order to make these claims operational we can rely on the ecological concept of coping with the sonic world and the cybernetic concepts of artificial and adaptive devices. Listeners, on this view, are able to change their semantic relations with the sonic world through functional adaptations at the level of sensing, acting and coordinating between action and perception. This allows us to understand music in functional terms of what it affords to us and not merely in terms of its acoustic qualities. There are, however, degrees of freedom and constraints which shape the semiotization of the sonic world. As such we must consider the role of event perception and cognitive economy: listeners do not perceive the acoustical environment in terms of phenomenological descriptions but as ecological events.

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Chapter 10 Dimensions of event perception

Cited by 9 publications

References 85 publications

Recognition of dance-like actions: Memory for static posture or dynamic movement?

Recognition of dance-like actions: Memory for static posture or dynamic movement?

The Muddle of Anticipation

A Biosemiotic and Ecological Approach to Music Cognition: Event Perception Between Auditory Listening and Cognitive Economy

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