Party Autonomy and the Role of Information in the Internal Market
DOI: 10.1515/9783110873030.230
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Chapter 13. Disclosure Rules as a Primary Tool for Fostering Party Autonomy

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“…27 The appeal of consumer information as a form of "asymmetrical paternalism" 28 derives from the fact that it enables governments to guide users towards the "right" choices, while leaving market mechanisms, the variety of products and services, and users' autonomy intact. 29 It has been argued that an informational approach is particularly promising for areas in which consumer preferences differ widely with respect to particular product characteristics, and there is a lack of political consensus on regulation. 30 In such situations, an informational approach as a form of "asymmetrical paternalism" is more likely to benefit those that may profit from some kind of government intervention, while imposing little harm or burdens on those who do not (for example, because they are politically or culturally interested in particular, and well-educated, and hence more likely to make well-informed choices).…”
Section: Theoretical Background: Changing Markets the Call For More C...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…27 The appeal of consumer information as a form of "asymmetrical paternalism" 28 derives from the fact that it enables governments to guide users towards the "right" choices, while leaving market mechanisms, the variety of products and services, and users' autonomy intact. 29 It has been argued that an informational approach is particularly promising for areas in which consumer preferences differ widely with respect to particular product characteristics, and there is a lack of political consensus on regulation. 30 In such situations, an informational approach as a form of "asymmetrical paternalism" is more likely to benefit those that may profit from some kind of government intervention, while imposing little harm or burdens on those who do not (for example, because they are politically or culturally interested in particular, and well-educated, and hence more likely to make well-informed choices).…”
Section: Theoretical Background: Changing Markets the Call For More C...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…176 Complex and onerous revelation duties provide for the well-educated consumer little information that this kind of consumer is not already familiar with and offers for simpler consumers little information that this type of consumer is able or willing to utilize and are, hence, promoting middle-class than lower-class consumers. 177 As a consequence, consumers with lower incomes may subsidize consumers with higher incomes. E.C.…”
Section: The Distribution Of Effects Of Consumer Lawmentioning
confidence: 99%