Chapter 18 The Media and Advertising: A Tale of Two-Sided Markets

Anderson, Simon P.; Gabszewicz, Jean Jaskold

doi:10.1016/s1574-0676(06)01018-0

Cited by 212 publications

(158 citation statements)

References 77 publications

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“…Worauf beruht die für zweiseitige Märkte enorm wichtige Interdependenz der Teilmärkte (vgl. Anderson & Gabszewicz, 2006)? Diese Interdependenz ist auf die Existenz zweiseitiger indirekter Netzwerkeffekte zurückzuführen (vgl.…”

Section: Ralf Dewenter Und Ulrich Heimeshoffunclassified

Neustrukturierung der öffentlich-rechtlichen Fernsehlandschaft: Theoretische Hintergründe und Reformoptionen

Dewenter¹,

Heimeshoff²

2013

Wettbewerb Und Regulierung in Medien, Politik Und Märkten

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Section: Ralf Dewenter Und Ulrich Heimeshoffunclassified

Neustrukturierung der öffentlich-rechtlichen Fernsehlandschaft: Theoretische Hintergründe und Reformoptionen

Dewenter¹,

Heimeshoff²

2013

Wettbewerb Und Regulierung in Medien, Politik Und Märkten

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“…Anderson and Gabszewicz (2006). 15 Exogenously fixing the number of potential transactions in the market at N, platform i's total expected transaction demand is ND R i p R i D S (A).…”

Section: Independent Complementary Platformsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Complementary Platforms

Cayseele¹,

Reynaerts²

2011

Review of Network Economics

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“…audience share and advertising revenue (Dewenter 2004;Anderson/Gabszewicz 2006). If a TV-program reaches a high audience share advertisers are very interested in transmitting their commercials in this program.…”

Section: Economic Competition On Media Marketsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Prohibition of the Proposed Springer-Prosiebensat.1-Merger: How Much Economics in German Merger Control?

Budzinski

Wacker

2007

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract: We review the Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office Germany) decision on the proposed merger between Springer and ProSiebenSat.1 from an economic point of view. In doing so, it is not our goal to analyse whether the controversial decision by the Bundeskartellamt has been correct or flawed from a legal point of view. Instead, we analyse whether the economic reasoning in the decision document reflects state-of-the-art economic theory on conglomerate mergers. Regarding such types of mergers, anticompetitive effects either do not occur regularly or are more often than not overcompensated by efficiency gains, so that a standard welfare perspective demands reluctance concerning antitrust interventions. This is particularly true if two-sided markets, like media markets, are involved. However, anticompetitive conglomerate mergers are not impossible, in particular in neighbouring markets where there is some relationship between the products of the merging companies. In line with the more-economic approach in European merger control, a particular thorough line of argumentation, backed with particularly convincing economic evidence, is necessary to justify a prohibition of a conglomerate merger from an economic point of view. Against this background, we do not find the reasoning of the Bundeskartellamt entirely convincing and sufficiently strong to justify a prohibition of the proposed combination from an economic perspective. The reasons are that (i) the Bundeskartellamt fails to continuously consider consumer and customer welfare as the relevant standards, (ii) positive efficiency and welfare effects of cross-media strategies are neglected, (iii) in contrast, the competition agency sometimes appears to view profitability of post-merger strategy options to be per se anticompetitive (efficiency offence), (iv) the incontestability of the relevant markets is not sufficiently substantiated, (v) inconsistencies occur regarding the symmetry of the TV advertising market duopoly versus the unique role of the BILD-Zeitung and (vi) the employment of modern economic instruments appears to be underdeveloped. Thus, we conclude that the Bundeskartellamt has not embraced the European more-economic approach in the analysed decision. However, one can discuss whether economic effects are overcompensated in this case by concerns about a reduction in diversity of opinion and threats to free speech. Similar to the Bundeskartellamt, we do not consider these concerns in our a...

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Chapter 18 The Media and Advertising: A Tale of Two-Sided Markets

Cited by 212 publications

References 77 publications

Neustrukturierung der öffentlich-rechtlichen Fernsehlandschaft: Theoretische Hintergründe und Reformoptionen

Neustrukturierung der öffentlich-rechtlichen Fernsehlandschaft: Theoretische Hintergründe und Reformoptionen

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The Prohibition of the Proposed Springer-Prosiebensat.1-Merger: How Much Economics in German Merger Control?

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