Chapter 24 Political Economy of Peacekeeping

Solomon, Binyam

doi:10.1016/s1574-0013(06)02024-2

Cited by 10 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…Approximately one-third of countries have abstained from peacekeeping altogether, while amongst active peacekeepers, certain states have participated in a far larger number of operations. Most importantly for the analysis here, individual countries have also proved selective in where they send their peacekeepers, demonstrating a greater propensity to volunteer for PKOs in specific countries than others (Neack, 1995, Pugh, 2004, Solomon, 2007.…”

Section: Post-cold War Peacekeepingmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…The period since the end of the Cold War has witnessed considerable growth in the number of multilateral peacekeeping operations (PKOs) (Chopra, 1996, Solomon, 2007, Welsh, 2003. Much of this expansion has taken place in the world's 'geopolitical blackholes' (Ó Tuathail, 2000: 170), spaces of instability where rising levels of conflict have been accompanied by economic collapse, human rights abuses and loss of life (Mullenbach, 2005, O'Loughlin, 2005, Silberfein, 2004.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Extra-territorial interventions in conflict spaces: Explaining the geographies of post-Cold War peacekeeping

Perkins

Neumayer

2008

Political Geography

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The period since the end of the Cold War has presided over a dramatic expansion in the number of multilateral peacekeeping operations (PKOs). Yet individual states have varied significantly in their enthusiasm for peacekeeping and, moreover, demonstrated a greater propensity to participate in operations located in certain countries than others. Our contribution in the present paper is to provide new insights into how geography underpins these spatial variations. Uniquely, we make use of a geographically disaggregated dataset of multilateral PKOs, which allows us to capture various dyadic linkages between sending and receiving countries. Our results confirm previous work indicating that more democratic countries are more likely to participate in PKOs, but extend these findings by showing that countries' commitment to human rights has a similar positive influence. We also show that aspects of spatial proximity (physical distance, same region) and relational proximity (colonial ties) between potential sending and receiving states raise the likelihood of participation. Yet we find that two relational variables widely discussed in the literature as possible correlates of peaceful interactions -bilateral trade and joint membership of intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) -have no statistically discernable influence on countries involvement in particular PKOs.

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Section: Post-cold War Peacekeepingmentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Extra-territorial interventions in conflict spaces: Explaining the geographies of post-Cold War peacekeeping

Perkins

Neumayer

2008

Political Geography

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“…Countries' assessment shares differ among ten classes of members (Coleman, 2014;Solomon, 2007). The five permanent Security Council members, who decide peacekeeping missions, pay 22% above their regular budget assessment scale, which hinges in part on their per capita income.…”

Section: Preliminaries and The Relevant Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Personnel contributions to UN and non-UN peacekeeping missions

Gaibulloev

George

Sandler

et al. 2015

Journal of Peace Research

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Based on spatial panel regressions for 1990-2012, this article draws publicness differences between peacekeeping personnel contributions to UN and non-UN peacekeeping operations. The analysis shows that UN missions are much less responsive to personnel spillovers, derived from other contributors' peacekeepers, than is the case of non-UN missions. UN peacekeeping missions display either no response or free riding to these personnel spillovers, while non-UN missions indicate spillover complementarity. Moreover, a number of controls distinguish the two kinds of peacekeeping, where non-UN missions display income normality and UN missions' deployments increase with the number of concurrent peacekeeping missions. The latter suggests that some countries specialize in supplying UN peacekeepers as a money-making venture. The positive response to the population variable supports this conjecture for UN missions, because a greater population base provides the recruits for peacekeeping operations. Our spatial empirical analysis accounts for the endogeneity of peacekeeper spillovers. The article concludes with a host of robustness tests that account for the alternative classes of peacekeepers, African Union and ECOWAS missions, and other empirical variants.

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“…Others have pointed to the financial reimbursement that India received from the UN through the high number of peacekeepers it has deployed through the years (Solomon 2007).…”

Section: Theories Of India's Commitment To Peacekeepingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…often lengthy bureaucratic process that financial compensations must go through (Solomon 2007). 13 The institutionalist response to the question "why do countries peacekeep?"…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Am I my brother’s peacekeeper? Strategic cultures and change among major troop contributors to United Nations peacekeeping

Libben

2017

Canadian Foreign Policy Journal

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AcknowledgementsFirst and foremost, I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my parents, whose example inspired me to start a doctorate in the first place and without whose support I would not have been able to complete this thesis. To my mother, who read the first draft and the last draft, and who provided invaluable advice and suggestions every step of the way. To my father, who has been an academic and intellectual role model throughout my life, and provides a constant reminder to me to never stop being curious. To my sister, who has been a source both of academic inspiration and commiseration, and who helped me see the light at the end of the Ph.D.tunnel when things seemed dark. To my supervisors, Dr. Claire Turenne-Sjolander and Dr. Miguel de Larrinaga, who supported my ideas from the start and who helped me navigate my way to a final draft. To my friend Doug, who has always been there to listen to my triumphs and defeats, and who has always been willing to talk about the big questions with me. To all my friends, who I have relied on time and again to replenish my energy and regain my perspective.To my wife, who helped me reach the end of this thesis in ways big and small, supporting me with her food, her advice, her love, and her very existence. And to my dog Lyla, who did her best to prevent me from writing this thesis while at the same time reminding me that sometimes it's important to stop writing, get up, and go for a walk.iii Tables Table 1: Summary of the three generations of strategic culture Table 2: Strategic norms concerning the legitimate ends and means of defence policy Table 3: The Peacekeeping Sweet Spot Table 4: Breakdown of scalable strategic norms Table 5: Member States with more than 1,000 peacekeeping troops, 1990-2015 Table 6 With 16 ongoing peacekeeping operations currently deploying almost 100,000 troops, United Nations peacekeeping is the largest single source of multilateral military intervention in conflict zones. Because UN peacekeeping is entirely dependent on voluntary contributions from Member States, there a pressing need to better understand why nations contribute peacekeeping troops in the first place. Individual national rationales for peacekeeping contribution vary significantly, and incentives may include regional hegemonic aspirations, positive economic benefits from peacekeeping, desiring a seat at the Security Council, or a combination of any number of incentives. This has made it difficult to provide a generalized explanation about why states provide peacekeepers. This thesis proposes a model for understanding the peacekeeping contribution issue under the lens of strategic culture. The strategic culture approach focuses on elite beliefs about the objectives of the use of force, with national factors such a geography, history, domestic politics, and bureaucracy forming into cohesive and competing norms about the purpose of the military. Drawing on the fourth generation of strategic culture literature, this dissertation argues that strategic culture serves as an...

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Chapter 24 Political Economy of Peacekeeping

Cited by 10 publications

References 34 publications

Extra-territorial interventions in conflict spaces: Explaining the geographies of post-Cold War peacekeeping

Extra-territorial interventions in conflict spaces: Explaining the geographies of post-Cold War peacekeeping

Personnel contributions to UN and non-UN peacekeeping missions

Am I my brother’s peacekeeper? Strategic cultures and change among major troop contributors to United Nations peacekeeping

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