Chapter 52 Theories of systems of cities

Abdel-Rahman, Hesham M.; Anas, Alex

doi:10.1016/s1574-0080(04)80009-9

Cited by 84 publications

(61 citation statements)

References 60 publications

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“…In order to analyze commuting within cities and between cities, the monocentric city framework was extended to a two-city model where workers choose where to live and where to work. In contrast to Abdel-Rahman and Anas [1] and many others, we have explicitly allowed for partial agglomeration of employment instead of full agglomeration. We have shown that commuting subsidies can help internalize externalities: Intracity commuting subsidies give incentives to move to the larger city and intercity commuting subsidies make residents of the periphery commute to the core.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Subsidies for intracity and intercity commuting

Borck

Wrede

2009

Journal of Urban Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Subsidies for Intracity and Intercity Commuting Abstract This paper analyzes subsidies for intracity and intercity commuting in an urban economics framework with two cities and agglomeration externalities, where workers may commute within and between cities. First, commuting subsidies serve to internalize agglomeration externalities: Intracity commuting subsidies give incentives to move to the larger city and intercity commuting subsidies make residents of the periphery commute to the core. Second, if agglomeration rents are locally captured, commuting subsidies act as a welfare enhancing transfer from the core to the periphery. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL Code: R14, R48.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This seems 14 to be standard in the literature (see e.g., Abdel-Rahman and Anas [1]). If, in contrast, rents are equally distributed across the entire metropolitan area, commuting subsidies no longer redistribute rents, but only correct the agglomeration externality with respect to long-distance commuting.…”

Section: Further Policy Instrumentsmentioning

confidence: 97%

Subsidies for intracity and intercity commuting

Borck

Wrede

2009

Journal of Urban Economics

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“…Since this subsidy internalizes all external effects, urban development and city creation should not be taxed or subsidized. The first-best allocation could be decentralized to urban developers who finance the wage subsidy exactly from the total differential land rent, following the Henry George theorem (see e.g., Abdel-Rahman and Anas, 2004). In practice, however, the nature of agglomeration externalities is highly complex and difficult to observe, which may explain why urban wage subsidies are rarely used as an instrument.…”

Section: Optimal Land Use Policy For a Fixed Number Of Citiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Agglomeration externalities and urban growth controls

Vermeulen

2016

J Econ Geogr

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Should constraints on urban expansion be relaxed because of external agglomeration economies? In a system of heterogeneous cities, we demonstrate that second-best land use policy consists of a tax on city creation and a subsidy (tax) on urban development in cities in which the marginal-average productivity gap is above (below) average. However, the implementation of this policy requires coordination at the system level. A tax on city creation does not raise welfare if development taxes are set decentrally by competitive urban developers, nor does correction of these taxes raise welfare if a tax on city creation is unavailable. In the resulting constrained optimal allocation, urban development is subsidized in all cities. The quantitative significance of these findings is explored in an application of our model. JEL classification: R52, R12, R13 Keywords: agglomeration externalities, growth controls, second-best policy, systems of cities Agglomeratie Externaliteiten en Ruimtelijke Ordening Abstract in DutchWat betekent het bestaan van externe agglomeratievoordelen voor ruimtelijke-ordeningsbeleid? We verkennen deze vraag in een gestileerd model voor een systeem van heterogene steden. Als instrumenten die direct op de externaliteit aangrijpen ontbreken, dan kan ruimtelijke ordening op twee manieren behulpzaam zijn. Op de eerste plaats is beleid dat het aantal steden beperkt welvaartsverhogend, omdat de steden die overblijven dan groter worden en de agglomeratievoordelen beter benutten. Omgekeerd leidt beleid dat de opzet van nieuwe steden faciliteert, zoals het (voormalige) groeikernenbeleid, tot een verlies aan agglomeratievoordelen elders in het systeem. Op de tweede plaats kan een combinatie van restricties en subsidies op nieuwbouw in bestaande steden ervoor zorgen dat de steden waar het externe agglomeratie-effect het grootst is, ook de meeste mensen binnen halen.

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“…Instead, we consider the urban system and allow for worker and firm mobility across cities to study how agglomeration economies, urban costs, heterogeneous locational fundamentals, heterogeneous workers and firms, and selection effects interact to shape the size, composition, productivity, and inequality of cities. In that respect, we build upon and extent many aspects of urban systems that have been analyzed before without paying much attention to micro level heterogeneity (see Abdel-Rahman and Anas, 2004 for a survey).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%