Chapter II. Noema and noetic-noematic correlation in Ideas I

Abstract

Twelve years after the publication of Logical Investigations, Max Niemeyer published Ideas I (1913). This work is regarded as the official beginning of the study of transcendental phenomenology. It was also the first time that the issue of noema and noetic-noematic correlation was addressed. Ideas I is essentially a continuation of Logical Investigations. However, Husserl repeatedly suggested differences between those works. The most important one concerns the conception of intentionality. In Ideas I intentional components, i.e., matter and quality are not the same as the essence of the act. Instead they are correlated with the functional moments and this relationship is by no means an ideational abstraction. Moreover, this conception of correlation in Ideas I is supported by the new terminology. Instead of speaking of relationships between the intentional essence and real moments, Husserl talks about the correlation between noema and noesis. However, the contribution of Ideas I is not limited to the new terminology. Included in there are a number of improvements with respect to the conception of intentionality and some of these will be explained here in detail.This chapter is devoted to the presentation of Husserl's idea of noema and noetic-noematic correlation as found in Ideas I. In order to specify the nature of noema, Husserl's original words will be interpreted in the light of different kinds of "transcendence" and in the context of contemporary notions of "dependent variation" and "supervenience".The prefatory section comprises an outline of the structures of noesis and noema as well as general contextual information. The following sections are devoted to a detailed analysis of the noeticnoematic correlation. They raise a number of issues, including: 1) the type of relation, i.e., whether it is a one-to-one or many-to-one Brought to you by | University of Michigan Authenticated Download Date | 7/1/15 5:56 AM 42 Husserl (Hua III, p. 194): "Was die Stoffe zu intentionalen Erlebnissen formt und das Spezifische der Intentionalität hereinbringt, ist eben dasselbe wie das, was der Rede vom Bewußtsein seinen spezifischen Sinn gibt: wonach eben Bewußtsein eo ipso auf etwas hindeutet, wovon es Bewußtsein ist". 43 Husserl (Hua III, p. 194): "Da nun die Rede von Bewußtseinsmomenten, Bewußtheiten und allen ähnlichen Bildungen, und desgleichen die Rede von intentionalen Momenten durch vielfältige und im weiteren deutlich hervortretende Äquivokationen ganz unbrauchbar ist, führen wir den Terminus n o e t i s c h e s Brought to you by | University of Michigan Authenticated Download Date | 7/1/15 5:56 AM