Characteristics of quantifiers moderate the framing effect

Abstract

The attribute framing effect, where people judge a quantity of an item more positively with a positively described attribute (e.g., “75% lean”) than its negative, albeit normatively equivalent description (e.g., “25% fat”), is a robust phenomenon, which may be moderated under certain conditions. In this paper, we investigated the moderating effect of the characteristics of the quantifier term: its format (verbal, e.g., “high,” or numerical, e.g., “75%”) and magnitude (i.e., if it is a small or large quantity) using positive or negative synonyms of attributes (e.g., energy vs. calories). Over five pre‐registered studies using a 2 (synonym, between‐subjects: positive or negative) × 2 (quantifier format, between‐subjects: verbal or numerical) × 2 (quantifier magnitude, within‐subjects: small or large) mixed design, we manipulated quantifier format and magnitude orthogonally for synonyms with differing valence. We also tested two mechanisms for the framing effect: whether the effect was mediated by the affect associated with the frame and whether participants inferred the speaker to be positive about the target. We found a framing effect with synonyms that was reversed in direction for the small (vs. large) quantifiers, but not significantly moderated by quantifier format. Both the affect associated with the frame and the inferred level of speaker positivity partially mediated the framing effect, and the level of mediation varied with quantifier magnitude. These results suggest that the magnitude of the quantifier modifies one's evaluation of the frame, and the mechanism for people's evaluations in a framing situation may differ for small and large quantifiers.

How Should Doctors Frame the Risk of a Vaccine’s Adverse Side Effects? It Depends on How Trustworthy They Are

“…We evaluated whether people were more likely to agree to be vaccinated when the risks of adverse side effects from the vaccine were positively framed (“they are unlikely,” focusing attention away from their possible occurrence) compared with negatively framed (“there is a small probability they will occur,” focusing attention toward their possible occurrence). Consistent with the “implicit advice” pragmatic account of the framing effect, 8 , 20 , 26 , 27 we found that the effect of framing depends on the trustworthiness of the speaker, but the patterns were more complex than that. The interaction pattern found on the COVID vaccination intention in experiments 1 and 2 conducted before most people could get vaccinated, and experiment 4, conducted on a hypothetical vaccine, showed the classic and expected framing effect in the trustworthy condition (i.e., positive framing increased vaccination intention) and a null or opposite tendency when the family physician was clearly incompetent and socially detached.…”

“…A study testing both the effect of valence and perceived advice based on different framing (e.g., 20% of your calories intake v. 20% of your energy intake) found supporting evidence for both the framing as bias and the framing as advice accounts, suggesting that valence and implicit advice might work in tandem. 27 However, the role of the trustworthiness of the source may disentangle which aspect of framing is most instrumental in decision making. For the ''framing as bias'' account, trust is not an essential ingredient for the effect, whereas for the ''framing as advice'' pragmatic account, trust is necessary.…”

“…According to this account, the framing effect occurs through a more reflective route, in which the frames implicitly convey an advice to the recipient. 8 , 26 , 27 Statements have different layers of meaning: a semantic meaning (of what is explicitly said) and a pragmatic meaning (of what is implied but not explicitly said). The pragmatic meaning of a statement often has a perlocutionary function (to follow the Speech Acts terminology of Austin 28 ), which means that it intends to shape the recipients’ behavior.…”

People prefer to predict middle, most likely quantitative outcomes (not extreme ones), but they still over-estimate their likelihood

“…Finally, participants estimated the probabilities of their chosen outcomes on a 0–100 visual analogue scale verbally ranging from 0%: impossible to 100%: certain , by increments of 1. The online questionnaire also included a vignette on the way people perceive framing in food descriptions ( Liu et al, 2022 ).…”

Erring on the side of caution: People misperceive energy consumption metrics more when energy goals are not achieved

“…Ideally, one should perceive the same amount (e.g., how much energy one has consumed) to be constant, no matter where it is relative to a target. Yet, decades of research show that people often contravene this principle of invariance (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986), with the same objective quantity perceived differently given different descriptors, or "frames" (e.g., Holford et al, 2021;Levin & Gaeth, 1988). In this paper we test two non-exclusive hypotheses derived from the socio-cognitive psychology literature offers for how and why quantities presented relative to a target could be misperceived.…”