Charitable Giving and "Excessive" Fundraising

Rose‐Ackerman, Susan

doi:10.2307/1880754

Cited by 241 publications

(128 citation statements)

References 5 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

122

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…On the one hand, donors are often perceived to dislike fundraising; they are thus likely to direct their donations to NGOs with lower shares of revenues used for fundraising (Rose-Ackerman 1982). 3 Similar to NGOs' costs for administration and management, fundraising expenditures may be regarded as "unproductive" or wasteful in the sense of not being directly related to the charitable output that donors would like to support.…”

Section: Background and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, the degree to which NGOs can actually raise additional aid resources remains open to debate. First, private donors tend to dislike NGOs that spend a large share of their budget on fundraising (Rose-Ackerman, 1982) so that fundraising expenditures do not necessarily result in higher donations. Second, substitution effects between different sources of revenues may diminish the overall pool of NGOs' resources.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Private Donations, Government Grants, Commercial Activities, and Fundraising: Cointegration and Causality for NGOs in International Development Cooperation

Herzer

Nunnenkamp

2013

World Development

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract:NGOs could help scale up foreign aid efforts by mobilizing private donations. However, fundraising activities do not necessarily result in higher donations, and substitution effects between different sources of revenue may diminish the overall pool of NGOs' resources. This paper examines the determinants of private donations to US-based NGOs engaged in international development cooperation. We employ panel cointegration and causality techniques to analyze the interactions between private donations, government grants, commercial revenues and fundraising expenditures. According to our results, a marginal dollar spent on fundraising yields almost five dollars in new donations in the long run. Government grants crowd in private donations in the long run, whereas commercial revenues crowd out donations in the long run. Moreover, our panel vector error correction model reveals complex short-run dynamics.

show abstract

Section: Background and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Private Donations, Government Grants, Commercial Activities, and Fundraising: Cointegration and Causality for NGOs in International Development Cooperation

Herzer

Nunnenkamp

2013

World Development

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…As mentioned in Section 1, this is a difficult relationship to untangle, as extensive fundraising activities may reduce donations from donors who dislike those expenditures, increase donations from donors who give more because of the activities financed by those expenditures, or perhaps even increase donations from those who appreciate the use of their gift to increase giving from others (Rose-Ackerman [1982]). Weisbrod and Dominguez [1986] directly tackle the question of the price of giving, defining it as the cost to the donor of providing a dollar of output by the charity, and estimate the effect of this efficiency price on giving using a panel of IRS filings by charities.…”

Section: Previous Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Effects of the Price of Charitable Giving: Evidence from an Online Crowdfunding Platform

Meer

2013

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…An announcement strategy not only helps high-quality projects to be recognized as being worthwhile, but it also enables them to reduce the traditional free-rider problem of private provision of public goods. 2 Examples of previous research on fundraising are Rose-Ackerman (1982), Steinberg (1985Steinberg ( , 1986Steinberg ( , 1991, Weisbrod (1988), Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996, 1997, Andreoni (1998), Slivinski and Steinberg (1998), and Romano and Yildirim (2001).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The informational value of sequential fundraising

Vesterlund

2003

Journal of Public Economics

385

258

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper examines a puzzling inconsistency between the theoretical prediction of private provisions to public goods and actual fundraising behavior. While fundraisers often choose to announce past contributions, economic theory predicts that contributions will be largest when donors are uninformed of the contributions made by others. This paper suggests that an announcement strategy may be optimal because it helps reveal the charity's quality. It is shown that when there is imperfect information about the value of the public good and contributors can purchase information regarding its quality, then there exist equilibria in which an announcement strategy is optimal. Interestingly, in equilibrium a high-quality charity receives contributions that exceed those that would result had the quality of the charity been common knowledge. Hence, an announcement strategy not only helps worthwhile organizations reveal their type, but it also helps the fundraiser reduce the free-rider problem. 

show abstract

Charitable Giving and "Excessive" Fundraising

Cited by 241 publications

References 5 publications

Private Donations, Government Grants, Commercial Activities, and Fundraising: Cointegration and Causality for NGOs in International Development Cooperation

Private Donations, Government Grants, Commercial Activities, and Fundraising: Cointegration and Causality for NGOs in International Development Cooperation

Effects of the Price of Charitable Giving: Evidence from an Online Crowdfunding Platform

The informational value of sequential fundraising

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About