Chat Apps and Cascade Logic: A Multi-Platform Perspective on India, Mexico, and the United States

Abstract

Chat apps such as WhatsApp, Telegram, and Signal are increasingly popular platforms for communication. Their sometimes-closed nature and encryption affordances present researchers, governments, and law enforcement with unique problems of access, traceability, and, ultimately, understanding. It also makes them useful vectors for sowing disinformation. This research assumes a multi-platform perspective, describing the particularities of how chat apps can be used toward disseminating mis- and disinformation by way of cascade logic—the means by which information in chat app ecologies is trafficked upstream (making its way from private conversations into the mainstream) as well as downstream (allowing information to withdraw from the public eye), providing space for distortion along the way. Cascade logic also describes how chat apps allow the gradual withdrawal and self-segregation of individuals into, or emergence out of, layered spaces of privacy and obfuscation. We present an interview-based study exploring chat apps in three countries, synthesizing unifying dimensions across cultures and contexts: India, the United States, and Mexico. We analyze data from in-depth conversations with 33 individuals who work to either produce or track political content on chat apps. These interviewees work for a wide array of organizations: political parties, governments, extremist groups, digital political consultancies, news entities, and civil society organizations. We reveal key insights into the tactics of producers of political content on chat apps and show how these platforms are particularly suitable for harnessing human connections, or leveraging communities of trust, to sow disinformation.

Audio misinformation on WhatsApp: A case study from Lebanon

“…It enjoys popularity in the Global South (Cruz & Harindranath, 2020) as well as parts of the Global North (Matassi et al, 2019;Paul, 2015;Sykes, 2018;Taipale & Farinosi, 2018), allows for end-to-end encrypted communication (Santos & Faure, 2018), and is a cheap way of communication that works through WiFi as well as through mobile Internet (Pereira & Bojczuk, 2018). WhatsApp constitutes a critical space for a broad array of activities of work and play, political debate, and the maintenance of authentic connections between members of trusted communities (Cruz & Harindranath, 2020;Gursky et al, 2022;Matassi et al, 2019;Rossini et al, 2021). Aside from voice calls, video calls, text, video, and photos, WhatsApp also affords the possibility to send audio messages.…”

How Disinformation on WhatsApp Went From Campaign Weapon to Governmental Propaganda in Brazil

“…In conjunction with the lack of a news feed, this also prevents information source traceability. Furthermore, message exchanges often occur between close contacts, given that accounts are associated with a cell phone number (Gursky et al, 2022; Rossini et al, 2021). Increasingly used for news sharing, WhatsApp can also be seen as a form of meso news-space where news engagement occurs inside a more intimate forum of communication (Tenenboim & Kligler-Vilenchik, 2020).…”

Hate Influencers’ Mediation of Hate on Telegram: “We Declare War Against the Anti-White System”

“…Telegram’s user interface allows a one-to-many and one-to-one messaging structure as well as public and private messaging in a single environment (Dargahi Nobari et al, 2021; Gursky et al, 2022; Shehabat et al, 2017). Telegram’s affordances allow hate influencers to control who is added or visible on channels, which, alongside its lax content moderation protocols, create spaces that layer privacy and obfuscation (Gursky et al, 2022). Hate influencers alternate between these public and private spheres, forming concealed spaces where refracted publics can “avoid being registered on the radar” (Abidin, 2021, p. 10).…”

“…Telegram is a mobile cross-platform, cloud-based encrypted instant messaging service (Baumgartner et al, 2020; Shehabat et al, 2017) with over 500 million monthly users (Telegram, 2022). Telegram’s user interface allows a one-to-many and one-to-one messaging structure as well as public and private messaging in a single environment (Dargahi Nobari et al, 2021; Gursky et al, 2022; Shehabat et al, 2017). Telegram’s affordances allow hate influencers to control who is added or visible on channels, which, alongside its lax content moderation protocols, create spaces that layer privacy and obfuscation (Gursky et al, 2022).…”