Cheap talk in games with incomplete information

Abstract

The paper studies Bayesian games which are extended by adding pre-play communication.Let Γ be a Bayesian game with full support and with three or more players. The main result is that if players can send private messages to each other and make public announcements then every communication equilibrium outcome, q, that is rational (i.e., involves probabilities that are rational numbers) can be implemented in a sequential equilibrium of a cheap talk extension of Γ, provided that the following condition is satisfied: There exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium s in Γ such that for each type t i of each player i the expected payoff of t i in q is larger than the expected payoff of t i in s.Journal of Economic Literature classification number: C7.

Distributed Protocols for Leader Election: A Game-Theoretic Perspective

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