Children's Distributive Justice Judgments: Aversive Racism in Euro‐American Children?

Lisi, Ann V. McGillicuddy De; Daly, Melissa; Neal, Angela M.

doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2006.00919.x

Cited by 52 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…Fehr et al (2008) find that children aged three to eight are more likely to choose an egalitarian allocation when dividing resources between themselves and an in-group member (defined as a child who attends the same pre-school, daycare or school) than with an out-group member. McGillicuddy-de Lisi et al (2006) find no evidence of in-group bias in allocations by young elementary school children to black and white story characters. Goeree, McConnell, Mitchell, Tromp, and Yariv (2010) find that dictator offers to schoolmates among girls aged ten to twelve are explained by social distance to the recipient, as measured by school friendship networks; however, observable characteristics of the recipient, including race, play little or no direct role in determining their allocations.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 53%

Ethnic identity and discrimination among children

Friesen

Arifovic

Wright

et al. 2012

Journal of Economic Psychology

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We engaged over 430 Canadian children in a series of activities designed to reveal their evaluations of three ethnic groups (White, East Asian and South Asian), their identification with these groups, and their behavior towards them in a dictator game. Our experiments took place at the children's schools during their normal school day, allowing us to evaluate the salience and effects of ethnic identities on economically relevant behavior in an important natural setting. We find that children from the dominant White category have a clear sense of White ethnic identity, and tend to favor White recipients in the dictator game relative to East Asian or South Asian recipients. Minority East Asian children reveal a more complex ethnic identity; they perceive themselves to be equally similar to White and East Asian children. Unlike Whites, East Asian children do not favor recipients from their own East Asian category, nor do they favor recipients with whom they tend to identify. If anything, East Asian children show out-group favoritism. © 2012 Elsevier B.V

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 53%

Ethnic identity and discrimination among children

Friesen

Arifovic

Wright

et al. 2012

Journal of Economic Psychology

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“…Decisions in the dictator game are real-with players mostly receiving money-whereas most distributive justice studies have used hypothetical scenarios (but see McGillicuddy-De Lisi, Daly, & Neal, 2006). In the dictator game, the receiver is anonymous, whereas in distributive justice tasks, the receivers are described by certain characteristics.…”

Section: The Dictator Game and Its Connection To Justice And Moral Rementioning

confidence: 99%

To Give or Not to Give: Children’s and Adolescents’ Sharing and Moral Negotiations in Economic Decision Situations

et al. 2008

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This study interconnects developmental psychology of fair and moral behavior with economic game theory. One hundred eighty-nine 9-to 17-year-old students shared a sum of money as individuals and groups with another anonymous group (dictator game). Individual allocations did not differ by age but did by gender and were predicted by participants' preferences for fair allocations. Group decision making followed a majority process. Level of moral reasoning did not predict individual offers, but group members with a higher moral reasoning ability were more influential during group negotiations and in influencing group outcomes. The youngest participants justified offers more frequently by referring to simple distribution principles. Older participants employed more complex reasons to justify deviations from allocation principles.Imagine that somebody gives you $10 and tells you that you may share this money with an anonymous person you will never meet. There is nobody observing you, and there seems to be no reason why giving part of the money to the other will benefit you. What would you do? In economic game theory, this scenario is called the dictator game. Over the past decades, economists have examined how adults divide real money with anonymous others in this game and have interpreted their allocation decisions as reflecting self-interest or norms of prosocial or fair sharing. Rarely have economists been interested in developmental questions. Conversely, developmental psychologists have long been investigating fair and prosocial behavior in children and adolescents without taking notice of the debate in economics. Because the dictator game differs from tasks typically used in research on fairness and moral development, connecting these two research traditions seems to be a promising interdisciplinary endeavor. In line with economic research, we used the real-life sharing situation of the dictator game with children and adolescents.There were three goals in the current research. The first was to find out whether children's and adolescents' allocations in the dictator game using real money differ from those of adults and across development. The second goal was to investigate whether participants' allocations would be influenced by psychological variables that have been shown in previous developmental research to affect fair and moral behavior. The third goal was to assess how groups of three peers achieve a common decision in group negotiations, and how they justify their offers to each other. We were specifically interested in whether participants with a certain allocation preference differ in influence during the group discussion, and whether level of moral development is related to gaining social influence in the group. The following sections will review previous research from economics and psychology that will help frame these questions in more detail. Research with the Dictator GameThe dictator game was designed to measure fairness preferences (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986) and is widely used in economic ...

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“…Thus, the primary difference between expectations for the advantaged and disadvantaged group members related to the impact of expected evaluations of the inequality (okay vs. not okay). In light of recent work indicating that stereotypes about deservedness based on status and group membership impact older children's allocation decisions (e.g., McGillicuddy-De Lisi, Daly, & Neal, 2006;Monteiro, de França, & Rodrigues, 2009), our findings are an indication of how early, and under what conditions, children expect others to exacerbate disparities.…”

Section: Advantaged Group Member: Converging Concernsmentioning

confidence: 82%

How do young children expect others to address resource inequalities between groups?

Elenbaas

Killen

2016

Journal of Experimental Child Psychology

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Age-related changes in young children's expectations for others' resource allocation decisions were investigated. Children ages 3 to 6years (N=80) were introduced to an inequality of resources between two groups. Participants gave their expectations for (a) how a member of the group with more resources (advantaged group) and a member of the group with fewer resources (disadvantaged group) would evaluate the inequality (okay or not okay), (b) which group each of the two individuals would prefer (ingroup or outgroup), and (c) how each of the two individuals would allocate subsequent resources between the groups. Findings revealed children's differing expectations for how others would address resource inequalities based on group status. Children expected that if the disadvantaged group member evaluated the inequality negatively then he or she would reduce the disparity. But children expected that if the advantaged group member evaluated the inequality positively then he or she would increase the disparity. Furthermore, 5- and 6-year-olds, but not 3- and 4-year-olds, expected individuals to seek more for their ingroup if they preferred their ingroup over the outgroup. Different from previous research on children's own resource allocation decisions, these findings reveal the circumstances under which children expect others to perpetuate or attenuate resource inequalities between groups.

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Children's Distributive Justice Judgments: Aversive Racism in Euro‐American Children?

Cited by 52 publications

References 39 publications

Ethnic identity and discrimination among children

Ethnic identity and discrimination among children

To Give or Not to Give: Children’s and Adolescents’ Sharing and Moral Negotiations in Economic Decision Situations

How do young children expect others to address resource inequalities between groups?

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