Children’s understanding of posterior probability

Girotto, Vittorio; González, Michael J.

doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.02.005

Cited by 70 publications

(60 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…Even 6-year-olds were able to make accurate probabilistic inferences, with both verbal and visually presented premises. Note that the latter results both confirm and extend those of Girotto and Gonzalez (2008) were using the same basic processes under both deductive and probabilistic instructions.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 77%

“…In fact, even infants have basic probabilistic intuitions (Téglás, Girotto, Gonzalez, & Bonatti, 2007). A recent study by Girotto and Gonzalez (2008) has shown that children this young can also understand the more complex notion of posterior probability, which involves updating judgments in uncertain situations on the basis of new evidence, an ability that must be a key component in the making of probabilistic inferences. These results indicate that very young children (around 6 years of age) possess the kind of understanding of probabilities that is required to understand the task demands involved in making a probabilistic conditional inference.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Different developmental patterns of simple deductive and probabilistic inferential reasoning

Markovits

Thompson

2008

Memory & Cognition

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dIn three studies, we examined simple counterexample-based and probabilistic reasoning in children 6, 7, and 9 years of age. In the first study, participants were asked to make conditional (if-f f then) inferences under both categorical (certain or uncertain) and probabilistic instructions. Results showed that 6-year-olds respond to both forms of inference in similar ways, but whereas probabilistic conditional inferences showed little development over this p period, categorical inferences clearly improved between 6 and 7 years of age. An analysis of the children's justifications indicated that performance under categorical instructions was strongly related to counterexample generation at all ages, whereas this was true only for the younger children for inferences under probabilistic instructions. These findings were replicated in a second study, using problems that referred to concrete stimuli with varying p probabilities of inference. A third study tested the hypothesis that children confused probability judgments with judgments of confidence and demonstrated a clear dissociation between these two constructs. Overall, these judgments of confidence and demonstrated a clear dissociation between these two constructs. Overall, these results show that children are capable of accurate conditional inferences under probabilistic instructions at a very t early age and that the differentiation between categorical and probabilistic conditional reasoning is clear by at least 9 years of age. These results are globally consistent with dual-process theories but suggest some difficulties for the way that the analytic-heuristic distinction underlying these theories has been conceptualized.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 77%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Different developmental patterns of simple deductive and probabilistic inferential reasoning

Markovits

Thompson

2008

Memory & Cognition

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“…Thus, apparently experienced frequency affects children's motor responses earlier than their overt judgments. ** This resistance to integrate experienced frequencies into explicit judgments is not caused by judgment perseveration, as 5-year-olds can modify their judgments integrating information disconfirming their initial hypotheses about the probabilities of future events (19). Rather, it looks like perceived frequencies and explicit reasoning about future states of affairs are computed by different mechanisms.…”

Section: Current Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intuitions of probabilities shape expectations about the future at 12 months and beyond

Téglás

Girotto

González

et al. 2007

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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208

129

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Rational agents should integrate probabilities in their predictions about uncertain future events. However, whether humans can do this, and if so, how this ability originates, are controversial issues. Here, we show that 12-month-olds have rational expectations about the future based on estimations of event possibilities, without the need of sampling past experiences. We also show that such natural expectations influence preschoolers' reaction times, while frequencies modify motor responses, but not overt judgments, only after 4 years of age. Our results suggest that at the onset of human decision processes the mind contains an intuition of elementary probability that cannot be reduced to the encountered frequency of events or elementary heuristics.cognitive development ͉ early numerical reasoning ͉ early probability reasoning ͉ infant cognitionThe theory of probabilities is at bottom only common sense reduced to calculus; it makes us appreciate with exactitude that which exact minds feel by a sort of instinct without being able oft times to give a reason for it. P. S. Laplace (1)

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“…(9,14). Before the age of 5-6 y, children also fail more complex tasks in which they have to consider prior and posterior information (14) or combinations of possibilities (15).…”

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confidence: 99%

Probabilistic cognition in two indigenous Mayan groups

Fontanari

González

Vallortígara

et al. 2014

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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Is there a sense of chance shared by all individuals, regardless of their schooling or culture? To test whether the ability to make correct probabilistic evaluations depends on educational and cultural guidance, we investigated probabilistic cognition in preliterate and prenumerate Kaqchikel and K'iche', two indigenous Mayan groups, living in remote areas of Guatemala. Although the tested individuals had no formal education, they performed correctly in tasks in which they had to consider prior and posterior information, proportions and combinations of possibilities. Their performance was indistinguishable from that of Mayan school children and Western controls. Our results provide evidence for the universal nature of probabilistic cognition.He that will look into many parts of Asia and America, will find men reason there perhaps as acutely as himself, who yet never heard of a syllogism . . . God has not been so sparing to Men to make them barely two-legged creatures, and left to Aristotle to make them rational.J. Locke (1)

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Children’s understanding of posterior probability

Cited by 70 publications

References 21 publications

Different developmental patterns of simple deductive and probabilistic inferential reasoning

Different developmental patterns of simple deductive and probabilistic inferential reasoning

Intuitions of probabilities shape expectations about the future at 12 months and beyond

Probabilistic cognition in two indigenous Mayan groups

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