2019
DOI: 10.1016/j.najef.2019.02.012
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Chilean pension fund managers and corporate governance: The impact on corporate debt

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Cited by 17 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…The current corporate governance framework in Chile goes back to 1981 when two laws were enacted: The Corporations Law and The Securities Market Law, which were amended several times (Jara et al, 2019). The new Corporate Governance Law was signed on October 2009.…”
Section: Chile and Spain As Comparable Institutional Contextsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The current corporate governance framework in Chile goes back to 1981 when two laws were enacted: The Corporations Law and The Securities Market Law, which were amended several times (Jara et al, 2019). The new Corporate Governance Law was signed on October 2009.…”
Section: Chile and Spain As Comparable Institutional Contextsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Likewise, the Chilean pension system is managed by private companies called pension fund administrators (AFPs by its acronym in Spanish) who are important institutional investors in the financial market. These pension managers act not only as bondholders but also as shareholders, with the ability to appoint a director to the board of directors (Jara, L opez-Iturriaga, San Mart ın, Saona, & Tenderini, 2019). Hence, these pension managers as institutional investors play a major role in the governance systems of Chilean companies.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the context of the Latin American corporate sector, it is much more plausible that institutional investors would be dedicated or long-term oriented than transient for several reasons. According to Jara et al (2019), institutional investors in Latin America have been the more influential and largest minority investors that contributed to the development of the capital markets and the enhancement of corporate governance systems. Similarly, Elyasiani, et al (2010) emphasised that institutional investors reduce asymmetries of information in the firms in which they participate.…”
Section: Ownership Structure Features and Real Activities Manipulationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Similarly, Elyasiani, et al (2010) emphasised that institutional investors reduce asymmetries of information in the firms in which they participate. Moreover, the voice monitoring of dedicated institutional investors has become less costly over the past few decades in Latin America as a consequence of their capacity for collective actions (Jara, L opez, & L opez-de-Foronda, 2012); whilst the exit policy of transient institutional investors has been increasingly costly given the substantial discounts when liquidating their portfolios (Jara et al, 2019). As an example, specifically in the case of Chile, according to Fern andez (2014), independent institutional investors played a key role as external monitors by spending resources and time supervising the governance and quality of decisions of companies they invest in.…”
Section: Ownership Structure Features and Real Activities Manipulationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Ademais, é importante ressaltar o papel social que os fundos de pensão possuem. Eles representam um investidor institucional importante para o mercado financeiro (ALDA, 2018;JARA et al, 2019), bem como uma fonte crucial de renda futura para os beneficiários a eles vinculados, particularmente para aqueles que são investidores não profissionais (ALDA, 2018). Os participantes dos fundos de pensão esperam uma remuneração segura e confiam na gestão destas entidades para que esse rendimento futuro seja garantido (GONZÁLEZ; LELYVELD; LUCIVJANSKÁ, 2020).…”
Section: Introductionunclassified