A recent report suggested that chimpanzees demonstrate the cognitive capacities necessary to understand cooking (Warneken & Rosati, 2015). We offered alternative explanations and mechanisms that could account for the behavioral responses of those chimpanzees, and questioned the manner in which the data were used to examine human evolution (Beran, Hopper, de Waal, Sayers, & Brosnan, 2015). Two commentaries suggested either that we were overly critical of the original report's claims and methodology (Rosati & Warneken, 2016), or that, contrary to our statements, early biological thinkers contributed little to questions concerning the evolutionary importance of cooking (Wrangham, 2016). In addition, both commentaries took issue with our treatment of chimpanzee referential models in human evolutionary studies. Our response offers points of continued disagreement as well as points of conciliation. We view Warneken and Rosati's general conclusions as a case of affirming the consequent-a logical conundrum in which, in this case, a demonstration of a partial list of the underlying abilities required for a cognitive trait/suite (understanding of cooking) are suggested as evidence for that ability. And although we strongly concur with both Warneken and Rosati (2015) and Wrangham (2016) that chimpanzee research is invaluable and essential to understanding humanness, it can only achieve its potential via the holistic inclusion of all available evidence-including that from other animals, evolutionary theory, and the fossil and archaeological records.Keywords Chimpanzees . Cooking . Evolution . Hominids .
Learning . CognitionRosati and Warneken (2016) and Wrangham (2016) have produced thoughtful responses to our review that can do much to further the conversation about the ideals of comparative psychology, as well as the requisite capacities for cooking. We believe that the individuals involved in this debate are, as a whole, fully committed to the idea that there is tremendous value in research assessing the behavior and cognition of chimpanzees, other great apes, and other primate species. It was not our intention to argue that one should not work with chimpanzees, or to deny that such work can contribute to a better understanding of human cognition (or, more broadly, of cognition itself, independent of species). All of the authors on the review article and the commentaries, including ourselves, rely heavily on chimpanzee research to contribute ideas to psychology, biology, and evolutionary theory, and we fully agree that this species is both important for this research agenda and interesting in its own right. We owe a debt of gratitude to chimpanzees for what we have learned through their involvement in psychological research. Here there is likely a broad consensus, even if opinions vary on just how good a model the chimpanzee is for human evolution, or whether the behavioral responses of chimpanzees to specific experimental tests can be used to infer higher-order cognitive capacities in specific cases.