Chimpanzee Theory of Mind: Looking in All the Wrong Places?

Andrews, Kristin

doi:10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00298.x

Cited by 53 publications

(44 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Whether this ability is uniquely human or shared with nonhuman primates is still highly controversial. Advocates of great apes' mentalizing capabilities can by now list an abundance of studies that support their view (for reviews, see Andrews, 2005;Call, 2007;Whiten, 2013). In contrast, sceptics are still not convinced and explain positive results by nonmentalistic processes, such as associative learning or inferences based on nonmentalistic categories (Heyes, 1998;Penn & Povinelli, 2007;Povinelli & Vonk, 2004).…”

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confidence: 99%

The goggles experiment: can chimpanzees use self-experience to infer what a competitor can see?

et al. 2015

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Keywords: chimpanzee experience projection perspective taking social cognition theory of mindIn two experiments, we investigated whether chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, can use self-experience to infer what another sees. Subjects first gained self-experience with the visual properties of an object (either opaque or see-through). In a subsequent test phase, a human experimenter interacted with the object and we tested whether chimpanzees understood that the experimenter experienced the object as opaque or as see-through. Crucially, in the test phase, the object seemed opaque to the subject in all cases (while the experimenter could see through the one that they had experienced as see-through before), such that she had to use her previous self-experience with the object to correctly infer whether the experimenter could or could not see when looking at the object. Chimpanzees did not attribute their previous self-experience with the object to the experimenter in a gaze-following task (experiment 1); however, they did so successfully in a competitive context (experiment 2). We conclude that chimpanzees successfully used their self-experience to infer what the competitor sees. We discuss our results in relation to the well-known 'goggles experiment' and address alternative explanations.

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confidence: 99%

The goggles experiment: can chimpanzees use self-experience to infer what a competitor can see?

et al. 2015

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“…Chimpanzees are asked to predict where a conspecific will go to obtain food. The methods for studying the understanding of other minds that rely on predictive tasks may not be the best way to determine whether an infant or an animal has that understanding, given the availability of other heuristics (Andrews 2005). We might expect to find more attribution of mental states in the explanation of behaviors.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

It’s in your nature: a pluralistic folk psychology

Andrews

2007

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I suggest a pluralistic account of folk psychology according to which not all predictions or explanations rely on the attribution of mental states, and not all intentional actions are explained by mental states. This view of folk psychology is supported by research in developmental and social psychology. It is well known that people use personality traits to predict behavior. I argue that trait attribution is not shorthand for mental state attributions, since traits are not identical to beliefs or desires, and an understanding of belief or desire is not necessary for using trait attributions. In addition, we sometimes predict and explain behavior through appeal to personality traits that the target wouldn't endorse, and so could not serve as the target's reasons. I conclude by suggesting that our folk psychology includes the notion that some behavior is explained by personality traits-who the person is-rather than by beliefs and desires-what the person thinks. Consequences of this view for the debate between simulation theory and theory theory, as well as the debate on chimpanzee theory of mind are discussed.

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“…We think of ourselves as making conscious, deliberate social judgements-and we can do that-but most of our interactions we manage without them. Shettleworth, for instance, discusses how human mate choice is affected by simple cues like shoulder width and waist-to-hip ratio (Singh et al 2010), while Barrett mentions how we predict what others will do based on the personality traits we assign to them, rather than on the mental states we think they have (Andrews 2005(Andrews , 2008. The human ability to function without 'theory of mind' is also illustrated by studies on infants; already at fifteen months, long before they pass verbal 'false belief' tasks, their looking times show that they expect others to search for objects where they have last seen them, rather than where they currently are (Onishi and Baillargeon 2005).…”

Section: Designing and Interpreting Experiments Bettermentioning

confidence: 99%

‘Theory of mind’ in animals: ways to make progress

Vaart

Hemelrijk

2012

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Whether any non-human animal can attribute mental states to others remains the subject of extensive debate. This despite the fact that several species have behaved as if they have a 'theory of mind' in various behavioral tasks. In this paper, we review the reasons of skeptics for their doubts: That existing experimental setups cannot distinguish between 'mind readers' and 'behavior readers', that results that seem to indicate 'theory of mind' may come from studies that are insufficiently controlled, and that our own intuitive biases may lead us to interpret behavior more 'cognitively' than is necessary. The merits of each claim and suggested solution are weighed. The conclusion is that while it is true that existing setups cannot conclusively demonstrate 'theory of mind' in non-human animals, focusing on this fact is unlikely to be productive. Instead, the more interesting question is how sophisticated their social reasoning can be, whether it is about 'unobservable inner experiences' or not. Therefore, it is important to address concerns about the setup and interpretation of specific experiments. To alleviate the impact of intuitive biases, various strategies have been proposed in the literature. These include a deeper understanding of associative learning, a better knowledge of the limited 'theory of mind' humans actually use, and thinking of animal cognition in an embodied, embedded way; that is, being aware that constraints outside of the brain, and outside of the body, may naturally predispose individuals to produce behavior that looks smart without requiring complex cognition. To enable this kind of thinking, a powerful methodological tool is advocated: Computational modeling, namely agent-based modeling and, particularly, cognitive modeling. By explicitly simulating the rules and representations that underlie animal E. van der Vaart (B) · C. K. Hemelrijk Behavioural Ecology and Self-Organisation, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands e-mail: e.e.van.der.vaart@rug.nl E. van der Vaart Institute of Artificial Intelligence, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands 123 336 Synthese (2014) 191:335-354 performance on specific tasks, it becomes much easier to look past one's own biases and to see what cognitive processes might actually be occurring.

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Chimpanzee Theory of Mind: Looking in All the Wrong Places?

Cited by 53 publications

References 22 publications

The goggles experiment: can chimpanzees use self-experience to infer what a competitor can see?

The goggles experiment: can chimpanzees use self-experience to infer what a competitor can see?

It’s in your nature: a pluralistic folk psychology

‘Theory of mind’ in animals: ways to make progress

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