China and India in the Age of Globalization

Abstract

In recent years, China and India have extensively liberalized their economies. They have departed from the East Asian developmental states, which have restricted foreign direct investment (FDI) to protect domestic industry, and the liberal FDI strategy of Latin America during a similar stage of development as they have eschewed dependent development. Instead, they have taken a "liberalization two-step," which follows liberalization with reregulation that varies across industrial sectors. Country and sectoral case studies demonstrate the perceived strategic value of a sector, sectoral characteristics, and the organization of state institutions shape the ways in which reregulation varies. Insulated from political pressures, the Chinese state shifts from universal controls on the aggregate level to selective controls at the sectoral level and adopts a bifurcated strategy in its reregulation. In India, the government liberalizes FDI according to state goals but reregulates as a function of sectoral interests arising from the legacy of its postindependence economic strategy.

Regulatory Visions and the State in E. Asia: The Irrational Investor Problem in the Comparative Politics of Finance

“…Hard paternalism might also be tied to the politics of state patronage and the legacy of developmentalism. Strong state control over finance is linked to industrial policy (Naughton & Tsai, 2015), techno-nationalism (Gruin & Knaack, 2020), and the strategic value of sectors (Hsueh, 2012). These arguments hinge on the idea that finance more broadly is to be used as a tool to support the state's strategic initiatives, and, thus, the sector is prevented from developing in a way that might harm institutional comparative advantage.…”

Corporations at a crossroads: How multilevel governance interactions shape participation and effort in private governance regimes

“…First, corporations do not always play the "provider" role in global governance. Rather, sometimes they inhibit the expansion of global governance and mobilize to defeat transnational rules pertaining to labor, environment, health, and safety (Bartley, 2018a) because they profit from cross-national regulatory differences (Bartley, 2014(Bartley, , 2018bHsueh, 2011Hsueh, , 2012Hsueh, , 2016Vogel, 2008Vogel, , 2010. Global businesses do so either by incorporating in tax and investment havens or by gravitating to sourcing destinations with less stringent enforcement of labor and environmental laws (Berliner, Greenleaf, Lake, Levi, & Noveck, 2015;Mayer & Phillips, 2017;Seabrooke & Wigan, 2017).…”

Resource Nationalism in Indonesia: Ownership Structures and Sectoral Variation in Mining and Palm Oil

“…The private sector's policy preferences are necessarily dependent upon the particular features of a sector or sub-sector-for example, the required capital investments for production, reliance upon foreign investors, the technological complexity of an industry, concentration and size of companies, and so forth. For this reason, scholars argue that business preferences are 'sectorally determined' (Shafer 1990;1994;Frieden 1991) and can be compared across different sectors between or within countries (Wright 1988;Atkinson and Coleman 1989;Kitschelt 1991;Shafer 1990;1994;Frieden 1991;Hsueh 2012;.…”

“…My conclusions also challenge assumptions about how policymakers respond to booms in their most strategic resource sectors. Other studies suggest that the more strategic a sector is to a country's economy, the more states seek to control it, and the more incentives exist for state actors to pursue nationalist intervention (Haslam and Heidrich 2016a;Hsueh 2016). However, a cross-sectoral comparison of nationalist mobilization in Indonesia suggests that in the most economically vital sectors, the risk of alienating private and foreign investment is higher.…”