2020
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-39066-2_4
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China: Climate Leader and Villain

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Cited by 20 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…13), on the other hand, claim that the "geopolitical complexity of greater electric interconnections between nations" will intensify global interdependence and vulnerabilities, thereby "reducing the risks of conflict". Similar debates arise concerning the implications of mineral supply chains: the increasing dependence of most states on China for rare earths (80% of global production), the Democratic Republic of the Congo for cobalt (60% of global production), and the Andean salt flats for lithium (40% of global reserves) may increase vulnerabilities to supply chain disruptions (whether intentional or accidental) (Meidan, 2020), though some suggest that these minerals are more geographically diffuse and therefore harder for one or several states to control, which may facilitate regional autonomy and dampen conflict pressures (Hafner & Tagliapietra, 2020).…”
Section: The Emerging Geopolitics Of Renewable Energymentioning
confidence: 90%
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“…13), on the other hand, claim that the "geopolitical complexity of greater electric interconnections between nations" will intensify global interdependence and vulnerabilities, thereby "reducing the risks of conflict". Similar debates arise concerning the implications of mineral supply chains: the increasing dependence of most states on China for rare earths (80% of global production), the Democratic Republic of the Congo for cobalt (60% of global production), and the Andean salt flats for lithium (40% of global reserves) may increase vulnerabilities to supply chain disruptions (whether intentional or accidental) (Meidan, 2020), though some suggest that these minerals are more geographically diffuse and therefore harder for one or several states to control, which may facilitate regional autonomy and dampen conflict pressures (Hafner & Tagliapietra, 2020).…”
Section: The Emerging Geopolitics Of Renewable Energymentioning
confidence: 90%
“…36). Other contributors point to China's near monopoly over rare earth minerals that are critical for the RE transition: in 2017, it accounted for 80% of rare earth production and is home to 36% of world reserves and has also made efforts to gain priority access to cobalt and lithium reserves around the world, which are critical for battery storage systems (Meidan, 2020).…”
Section: The Emerging Geopolitics Of Renewable Energymentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…A long moment has elapsed since China began engaging in sustainable power to reach 15% of its total energy supply from renewable sources by 2020. In 2018, it was 14.3%, with a 33% share of overall spending on renewable (IRENA 2020 ; Meidan 2020 ). To be competitive and effective today, other nations need to rethink their sustainability practices within the SDGs paradigm.…”
Section: Conclusion and Policy Implicationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In order to defend its interests in the energy domain and elsewhere, Russia will have to find ways to confront this central paradox. In this essay, China's energy influence on the region will be examined via two contradictory pressures, both detrimental to Russia's objectives: Beijing's renewable energy investments, which have driven down the cost of solar and wind, on the one hand, and China's demand for Eurasian oil and gas, which has led Beijing to finance new hydrocarbon projects in the region, on the other (Meidan 2020).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%