China in the Arctic: interests, actions and challenges

Abstract

<p>This article gives an overview of China’s interest in and approach to the Arctic region. The following questions are raised: 1.Why is China getting involved in the Arctic, 2. How is China’s engagement in the Arctic playing out? 3, What are the most important issues that need to be solved in order for China to increase its relevance and importance as a political actor and partner in the Arctic. In applying a rationalist approach when answering the research questions, I identify how China in the last few years increasingly has been accepted as a legitimate stakeholder in the Arctic, with important stakes and activities in areas such as shipping, resource utilization and environmental science. The article concludes with pointing out some issues that remain to be solved including Chinas role in issues of global politics, the role of observers in the Arctic Council as well as pointing out how China itself needs to decide important aspects of their future role in the region.</p>

Why Is China Going Polar? Understanding Engagement and Implications for the Arctic and Antarctica

“…Lim (2018) considers that the 2018 Artic White Paper embodies the assertion of China's interestsrather a fundamental novelty. Incidentally, what is stated in the Arctic White Paper was foreshadowed by many attentive observers (Lanteigne, 2014;Wegge, 2014;Brady, 2012;2017a;2017b;Duarte, 2017). According to Wright (2011), China always struggled to engage in the Arctic.…”

“…2 Such status provides the country with a limited influence on the Arctic issues, meaning that Beijing can only participate in working groups (Brady, 2017b;Moe & Stokke, 2019). At the same time, China has acknowledged the Arctic Circle states' exclusive voting power, territorial sovereignty, and authority to promote and defend their interests in the region (Wegge, 2014;Willis & Depledge, 2013).…”

“…The first period, spanning from 1990 to 2017, is characterised by China's concern with global warming. On this matter, Beijing argued that air currents from the Arctic were jeopardising China in economic, social and climate terms (Aleexeva & Lassere, 2012;Wegge, 2014). The second period of China's rhetoric has begun in 2018, when Beijing published the Arctic Policy; and has been designed to justify Chinese presence in the Arctic.…”

China's bilateral diplomacy in the Arctic

“…The Liu Xiaobo incident offers a glimpse into China's punitive countenance in foreign policy. When countries offend China with acts interpreted as an intention to meddle with its 'internal affairs', the Chinese government does not hesitate to respond with punitive measures, mainly in the form of cutting off economic and political exchanges (Wegge 2014).…”

“…Beijing broke a particular important impasse in 2013 when China was granted permanent observer status in the Arctic Council, along with five other non-Arctic states (South Korea, Japan, India, Singapore, and Italy). The decision came only after strenuous debates within the Arctic states, including multiple exchanges between them and the applicants for observer status on the issue over several years (Myers 2013, Wegge 2014. Along with its diplomatic efforts for a non-Arctic state observer status in the Arctic Council, China has also pursued a parallel track aimed at strengthening its bilateral ties with the Arctic states.…”