China–Pakistan cooperation on Afghanistan: assessing key interests and implementing strategies

Abstract

This article studies China's and Pakistan's key interests in Afghanistan, and their mutual cooperation to pursue them. It identifies security, energy, connectivity and geopolitics as China's main interests. Get recognition of the Durand Line as an international border with Afghanistan, prevention of 'hostile elements' from using Afghan territory and access to the CARs as those of Pakistan's motives. Both sides cooperated with each other on Afghanistan under the umbrella of their strategic partnership. Islamabad helped in establishing initial Taliban-China contacts and persuaded the Taliban for negotiations with the USA and Kabul authorities. Beijing supported Islamabad's Afghan policy and mediated between Islamabad-Kabul and Taliban-Kabul negotiations. China and Pakistan backed their diplomacy with economic assistance and extended CPEC and BRI to Afghanistan. Amidst various challenges, thus far Sino-Pakistan cooperation on Afghanistan has benefited to their mutual interests and contributed to the peace process. Afghanistan has emerged as a new chapter of their relationship. How Sino-Pakistan cooperation advances in this troubled country in future is yet to be seen.

Chinese Geo-Strategic Objectives and Economic Interests in Afghanistan under President Xi Jinping

“…The China air corridor was built to improve the pine nut industry in Afghanistan, which had suffered significant financial losses as a result of smuggling through Pakistan. In the air corridor, modest growth in exports of pine nut has been guided as expected (Ali, 2020).…”

The Pragmatic Neighbour: China’s Afghanistan Policy 2001–2021

“…By 2013, however, the Chinese leaders realised that a more coordinated and ambitious effort was needed in order to deepen China’s economic and commercial ties in the region. Chinese leaders were also aware that China’s rise in the twenty-first century has generated strong nationalist sentiments at home, which the Communist Party had to harness constructively or risk losing its legitimacy and grip on power (Ali, 2020, pp. 94–96; Ferdinand, 2016).…”

“…These policies were then officially combined at the November 2013 Third Party Plenary session of the eighteenth Party Congress to become the One Belt One Road Strategy, later renamed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Xinhua, 2015). 5 While there has been some debate as to the effectiveness of China’s efforts to roll out a project of this scope and magnitude, it is undeniable that the BRI has become central to Chinese foreign policy efforts over the past decade (Ali, 2020; Rolland, 2017).…”

“…Arguably of more interest to China is Afghanistan’s significant mineral deposits that hold the potential for exploitation, with estimates of untapped mineral wealth ranging between US$1 trillion and US$3 trillion (Ali, 2020, pp. 6–7; Umarov, 2017, p. 401).…”

“…Although little tangible benefits came from these China facilitated meetings, Beijing was ostensibly successful in reducing tensions between the Kabul and Islamabad. China also began to more actively participate with the Afghan government in multilateral groups, including the UN+1 Dialogue and the Quadrilateral Coordination Group which consisted of Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and the USA (Ali, 2020, pp. 13–14; Chaziza, 2018, pp.…”