China’s Approach to Regional Cooperation

Abstract

China’s rise has inspired a variety of interpretations arguing for either its potentially disruptive or alternatively its benign impact on Asia–Pacific security. This article aims to contribute to this debate. It focuses on the upsurge in Beijing’s multilateral diplomacy since the beginning of the 1990s, which has been reflected in China’s willingness to take part in many regional institutions, such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Six Party Talks (6PT), East Asia Summit (EAS) or Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). But what are China’s motivations for participation in these institutions? Are they instrumental, driven by pragmatic self-interest, or moral, driven by normative values of peace? Or, has China merely accepted the need to play a socially ‘appropriate’ role within the region? The article offers a theoretically informed typology of the different kinds of motivation that can explain China’s multilateral diplomacy in the last three decades. It argues that whereas social motivation played a decisive part in the first phase of China’s multilateralism, instrumental motivation can be seen as defining the more recent phase.

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