China's Industrial Development

Brandt, Loren; Rawski, Thomas G.; Sutton, John

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511754234.016

Cited by 59 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…It seems that there exists some prima facie evidence that lends support to our hypothesis; see e.g. Brandt et al (2008). Arguably, the existence of political economy motives on the parts of agents and vested interest groups are less prevalent in some East Asian countries than in Europe.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 57%

Entrepreneurship and conflict generating product price changes

Schweinberger

Woodland

2015

European Economic Review

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 57%

Entrepreneurship and conflict generating product price changes

Schweinberger

Woodland

2015

European Economic Review

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“…SOEs have been the pillar of China's economy. In 1978, SOEs delivered 78% of industrial output, contributed two‐thirds of the government revenue, and employed three‐fourths of all industrial workers (Naughton ; Brandt, Rawski, and Sutton ). They enjoy government support policies such as subsidized bank loans, debt forgiveness, grants, equity infusions, and preferential access to key inputs such as land, utilities, and raw materials .…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

The political economy of tariff protection in China: evidence from the WTO accession

Chen

2013

Canadian J of Economics

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We analyze China's tariff rates at WTO accession using a political economy approach. A model drawing on Branstetter and Feenstra (2002) is used to derive an optimal tariff rate for each industry. The model predicts that a government would set a high tariff rate if an industry is of large state-owned enterprise (SOE) share, multinational share, or small foreign import share. From the model we reveal the Chinese government's preference towards different interest groups under the binding tariff constraint from the WTO commitments. The estimated structural parameters imply that the political weights on both the SOE profits and consumer income diminish with the economic opening. More important, the government still favours SOEs over consumer income. Our findings are consistent with the special features of China's economy. JEL classification: F13, F14Economie politique de la protection tarifaire en Chine: résultats dérivés de l'accessionà l'OMC. L'auteur analyse,à l'aide d'une approche d'économie politique, les droits de douane de la Chine lors de son accessionà l'Office mondial du commerce. Un modèle s'inspirant de Branstetter & Feenstra (2002) est utilisé pour dériver un droit de douane optimal pour chaque industrie. Le modèle prédit qu'un gouvernement va fixer un droit de douaneélevé si l'industrie est soit partie du grand secteur des entreprises d'État (EE), du secteur des multinationales, ou du secteur où l'importation est peu importante. On révèle les préférences du gouvernement chinois entre les divers groupes d'intérêts face aux contraintes imposées par les engagements vis-à-vis l'Office mondial du commerce. Les paramètres structurels calibrés impliquent que le poids politiqueà la fois des profits des EE et des revenus des consommateurs diminue quand il y a libéralisation du commerce. Plus important peut-être, le gouvernement favorise toujours les profits des EE plutôt que le revenu des consommateurs. Ces résultats s'arriment bien aux caractéristiques spéciales de l'économie chinoise.

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“…23 According 23. As found by Brandt, Rawski, and Sutton (2008), there has been quality upgrading over the reform era as measured by the rise in the R&D and capital intensity of China's exports, which has counteracted the downward pressure on price due to international markets saturation. Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita output.…”

Section: Transitional Dynamics From Different Channels Of Technolomentioning

confidence: 99%

Is Physical Investment the Key to China's Growth Miracle?

Romero‐Ávila

2013

Economic Inquiry

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This paper applies Jones' test for the empirical validity of AK-type models to the Chinese economy over the period 1952 (Jones C. I., Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 1995a. We aim to establish whether large permanent movements in the physical investment rate cause permanent movements in output growth. The evidence indicates that the one-sector AK model cannot be rejected. We also find that augmenting the model to allow for transitional dynamics-via imbalances in factor endowments, structural transformation, and R&D-based technology transfer-does a better job in describing China's growth dynamics than the basic AK model. (JEL C22, O41, O47)

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China's Industrial Development

Cited by 59 publications

References 33 publications

Entrepreneurship and conflict generating product price changes

Entrepreneurship and conflict generating product price changes

The political economy of tariff protection in China: evidence from the WTO accession

Is Physical Investment the Key to China's Growth Miracle?

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