The middle-income trap refers to a middle-income country's failure to become a highincome country in a timely manner. Many examples are found in Latin America and Middle East. In light of the recent growth slowdown of the Chinese economy, one cannot deny the possibility that even hitherto fast-growing Asian emerging states might fall into the trap. It is no wonder that much has been written about the trap since the pioneering work by Gill and Kharas (2007). According to Kharas and Kholi (2011, p. 281), trapped countries are "unable to compete with either low-wage economies or highly skilled advanced economies." The economist typically points to the critical need for industrial upgrading, which in turn requires increased innovation capacity and an education system tuned to an innovation-led economy (e.g., Glawe and Wagner 2017; Agénor 2017), while the political scientist rather stresses the difficulty of meeting the need. For example, Tsunekawa (Chap. 2 of this volume) argues that technological upgrading requires the coordination of interests between management and labor. Kanchoochat (Chap. 3 of Volume 3) argues that economic growth inevitably creates winners and losers, which is a source of conflicts, and that unless conflict is managed, growth cannot continue. Shiraishi (Chap. 1 of this volume) argues that Asian emerging states will not be able to keep their economies growing without working on nation building. Hill et al. (2012, p. 1704) argue that innovation as "a painful process of creative destruction" in which old firms and industries are replaced by new ones may be blocked by the "political power of old firms." This chapter takes part in the discussion on the politics of economic growth. It focuses on middle-income economies, for which rapid economic growth for an