This report studies how China implements its grand strategy in Asia using institutions. To address this question, we first reviewed the literature on China's grand strategy, its use of institutions, and its emphasis on Asia. We then turned to policy experts to discuss China's use of institutions to implement its grand strategy toward Asian nations of interest to China, including, as a case study, the countries of the Korean Peninsula.Our findings are as follows: China's grand strategy since the end of the Cold War has consistently been guided by its long-term goal of building a pre-eminent Asian presence and a larger global presence in the socioeconomic, diplomatic, and defense arenas. To achieve this goal, China currently desires to accomplish three outcomes: (1) achieve greater economic integration with Asia and the rest of the world, (2) manage its rivalry with the United States, and (3) build soft power globally.The desired outcomes have changed over the past three decades in response to changing circumstances within and outside China. China's strategies to achieve its desired outcomes have also evolved in turn. One main strategic change is China's increased use of multilateral, regional, and bilateral institutions to address the socioeconomic, diplomatic, and national security dimensions of China's interests. China has found regional and bilateral institutions particularly important for its implementation of strategy in Asia.In our case study, we find that China mostly uses institutions to accomplish greater economic integration with both North and South Korea. To manage its rivalry with the United States in the Korean Peninsula, as well as build soft power, China uses both institutional and noninstitutional initiatives. We draw from these findings to derive several implications-both for the adequacy of China's institutions-based approach and for the responses by middle powers.