China's Out of Area Naval Operations: Case Studies, Trajectories, Obstacles, and Potential Solutions

Abstract

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Ball Game between U.S and China in Indian Ocean: Upshot for Pakistan

“…Beijing's aggressiveness stems from fear and opportunism in response to the perceived USA threat. The United States must prepare for all possibilities, though (Yung, 2010) "As China's influence grows, many experts and politicians regard it as a growing rival that seeks to undermine the West and the existing rules-based system. For economic and strategic reasons, India's ascent is seen favorably by many USA strategic analysts" (Orlik, 2020).…”

An Indian Ocean dilemma: Sino-Indian rivalry and China's strategic vulnerability in the Indian Ocean

“…China's overall naval capabilities now exceed India's in quantitative and qualitative terms and this differential is likely to expand in the coming years. But, significantly, China's power projection capabilities in the Indian Ocean are limited and are likely to remain so in the foreseeable future (Yung, 2010). The PLA Navy has little experience in projecting power beyond coastal waters.…”

Beyond the ‘String of Pearls’: is there really a Sino-Indian security dilemma in the Indian Ocean?

“…One review of PLAN's out-of-area capabilities concluded that it cannot currently conduct a full-scale joint forcible entry operation, maintain maritime superiority out of area (i.e. outside of East Asia), conduct multicarrier or carrier strike group operations, or provide comprehensive protection against threats to an out of area task force (Yung et al, 2010). According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, any conflict involving supply lines stretching further than 200 miles or which did not involve a contiguous land corridor would severely restrict the PLA's ability to deploy and maintain its forces (IISS, 2011, p. 134).…”