China’s rise in English school perspective

Abstract

This chapter looks at English School (ES) theory as a way of understanding China and its rise. It focuses both on where ES theory fits well enough with China to provide an interesting perspective, and on where 'Chinese characteristics' put China outside the standard ES framing and raise theoretical challenges to it. The first section briefly reviews the ES literature on China. The second section places China within the normative structure of contemporary global international society by looking at how China relates to the primary institutions that define that society. The third section explores two challenges that 'Chinese characteristics' pose for how the ES thinks about international society: hierarchy and 'face'. The Conclusions assess the strengths and weaknesses of ES theory in relation to understanding the rise of China.

Religion as ‘Prime Institution’ of International Society

“…12 In English School thought primary institutions 'are constitutive of both states and international society, in that they define not only the basic character of states but also their patterns of legitimate behaviour in relation to each other, as well as the criteria for membership of international society' (Buzan, 2014a, p. 17). Buzan identifies and labels 'sovereignty, territoriality, the balance of power, war, diplomacy, international law and great power management' (Buzan, 2014a, p. 16) as the 'classical "Westphalian" set' (Buzan, 2014a), as they are understood to have constituted the society of nation states which was established by the Westphalian Peace. Such institutions are presented as being constitutive of states and the international society and the debate as to how they evolved was touched upon briefly above.…”

China in Latin America Then and Now: A Systemic Constructivist Analysis of China’s Foreign Policy

“…That being said, comparing China's foreign policy goals towards Latin America then and now, it is fair to say that China has changed from a revolutionary revisionist power to a reformist one if not an orthodox one. Unlike a status quo power, China today does want to change its status/rank in the international system; however, unlike a revolutionary revisionist power (and an orthodox one), China is accepting some formal and informal institutions of the exiting international system (such as those about market economy promoted by the US and the West in general) while challenging others (such as those about the US/Western-defined democracy and human rights) (Buzan, 2010(Buzan, , 2014(Buzan, , 2018.…”

“…Beginning in 1999, China started to encourage Chinese companies to invest abroad with its "going out" policy while continuing to strengthen its trade relations and attract inward foreign investment. In 2001, with the support from the US and other major powers, China was admitted to the World Trade Organization and formally integrated into the US/Western-led world economic order (Buzan, 2018). This development, from China's perspective, exemplifies the overall positive responses from other countries, especially those major powers, to its "reform and opening up" initiated in the late 1970s.…”

“…It is the opposite of a “status quo power,” which “is happy with both its status/rank and with the institutions of international society” and “accepts the rules of the game not just for instrumental calculations of self-interest, but ideationally, because it accepts the values as valid” (Buzan, 2010: 16–17). However, it is worth noting that, according to Buzan (2010 -2018), there are three different kinds of revisionist powers based on, first of all, whether it is happy with its status/rank in the international system and, second, how it responds to the existing international order with which it is not satisfied. A revolutionary revisionist power is extremely unhappy about its status/rank in the international system, contests the formal and informal institutions of the system, and seeks to overthrow the existing order maintained and promoted by the status quo powers (Buzan, 2010).…”

“…Here, as Buzan (2018: 451–452) argues, China’s foreign relations can be divided into two periods: “the Maoist, revolutionary one, when China was largely alienated from, oppositional to, the US-dominated GIS [Global International Society]; and the one since the late 1970s, when China rejoined what was a more globalized, but still US-led GIS.” In the rest of this article, I also divide China’s foreign policy towards Latin America into those two periods of time as suggested by Buzan. I will first compare China’s policy goal towards the region in that “revolutionary” period when China was a revolutionary revisionist power to the goal since the late 1970s when China is more like a reformist revisionist power.…”