China's Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure

Abstract

China exploded its ªrst nuclear weapon at the Lop Nor test facility in Xinjiang. China's subsequent development of its nuclear strategy and force structure presents a puzzle for scholars and policymakers alike. Following its initial development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities, China built a small, unsophisticated, and, arguably, highly vulnerable nuclear force. In addition, for more than three decades, the pace of China's nuclear modernization efforts was slow and gradual despite the continued vulnerability of its force. In relative terms, China's nuclear forces were far smaller and less diverse than those of the United States or the Soviet Union both during and after the Cold War. At the same time, China did not develop detailed operational doctrine for overcoming its relative inferiority, let alone for the effective use of its arsenal. Such a nuclear posture called into question the credibility of China's ability to deter states with much larger arsenals, more reªned doctrines, and more powerful conventional military forces. 1 In retrospect, the degree of vulnerability that China was willing to accept after developing nuclear weapons is striking.Although China has sought to enhance its second-strike capability since the mid-1990s, the ªrst three decades of China's approach to nuclear modernization and doctrinal development raises several important questions that this article seeks to answer. First, why did China maintain such a small and vulnerable nuclear force structure for so long, given that it undermined China's ability to deter nuclear aggression? Second, why did China not develop a detailed ceptable damage through a retaliatory nuclear strike, offers a useful framework for understanding the evolution of China's nuclear strategy and force structure.In the literature on China's nuclear weapons, however, few scholars have explored the origins of Chinese beliefs about the roles and missions of nuclear weapons and, as a consequence, the drivers of nuclear force development. One line of inquiry examines China's decision to acquire nuclear weapons, including the seminal works by Alice Hsieh as well as John Lewis and Xue Litai on the history of China's strategic weapons programs. 7 Another line of inquiry probes how best to characterize China's nuclear strategy. Much of the debate revolves around whether China pursues either minimum deterrence or limited deterrence. 8 Minimum deterrence refers to "threatening the lowest level of damage necessary to prevent attack, with the fewest number of nuclear weapons possible." 9 Similarly, limited deterrence "requires a limited war-ªghting capability to inºict costly damage on the adversary at every rung on the escalation ladder, thus denying the adversary victory in a nuclear war." 10 The mainstream view remains that minimum deterrence best captures the essence of China's approach. 11 Finally, other scholars argue that China has adopted a International Security 35:2 50

China's Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Major Drivers and Issues for the United States

“…22 Johnston, 1996. 23 Those who have emphasized more limited thinking by Chinese strategists and a higher degree of continuity in nuclear policy and doctrine include Fravel and Medeiros, 2010;Chu Shulong and Rong Yu, "China: Dynamic Minimum Deterrence," in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2008; Yao Yunzhu, "Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence," Strategic Insights, Vol. 4, No.…”

“…24 See, for example, Chase, 2013b. 25 Fravel and Medeiros, 2010;Cunningham and Fravel, 2015. China nuclear dynamics. 26 Chinese nuclear dynamics with third parties are less well studied, and most of the writing on these topics is incorporated in volumes on China's broader relationships with individual countries.…”

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“…China, since it first acquired nuclear capabilities in 1964, has been developing a nuclear posture aimed at minimal deterrence, emphasising survivability and retaliatory power of its atomic arsenal after a first strike (Fravel and Medeiros 2010). The CSBA paper assumes that China even in case of a conflict that had extended to its territory would maintain this approach.…”

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“…China is engaged in major program to modernize its nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, and North Korea is widely estimated to construct additional warheads from its limited polutonium stocks (Fravel and Medeiros 2010;Nitkin 2011). Continuity in the essential elements of the nuclear order does not mean that these three essential principles cannot find expression in a new context.…”