China's SOE Executives: Drivers of or Obstacles to Reform?

Brødsgaard, Kjeld Erik; Hubbard, Paul; Cai, Guilong; Zhang, Linlin

doi:10.22439/cjas.v35i1.5399

Cited by 14 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 10 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“… 20 Brødsgaard, Hubbard, Cai and Zhang 2017; Liou and Tsai 2013; 2017; Lin 2013; 2017; Liu and Zhang forthcoming; Yang, Wang and Nie 2013. …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Mobility of China's Central State-Owned Enterprise Leaders

Leutert¹

2018

The China Quarterly

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Extensive research on the political mobility of Chinese officials at central, provincial, municipal and county levels has yet to fully consider an important group of elites – the leaders of China's core central state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This paper presents the first systematic analysis of their political mobility between 2003 and 2012 using an original biographical dataset with 864 leader-year observations. Under the Hu Jintao administration, these leaders emerged as a distinctive group within China's top political elite: increasingly well-educated but lacking experience beyond state-owned industry, with both lengthening leadership tenures and years of previous work in their companies. Instead of a “revolving door” through which these individuals rotate routinely between state-owned business and the Party-state to positions of successively higher rank, a top executive posting was most often a “one-way exit” to retirement. Of those who advanced politically, virtually all were transferred laterally along three career pathways with little overlap: to other core central SOEs; provinces; and the centre. This paper underscores the theoretical importance of disaggregating types of lateral transfer to research on Chinese officials’ political mobility and the cadre management system.

show abstract

“… 20 Brødsgaard, Hubbard, Cai and Zhang 2017; Liou and Tsai 2013; 2017; Lin 2013; 2017; Liu and Zhang forthcoming; Yang, Wang and Nie 2013. …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Mobility of China's Central State-Owned Enterprise Leaders

Leutert¹

2018

The China Quarterly

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…However, local SOEs and central SOEs could be different in terms of practices, regulations, and implementations due to the difference between central government and local governments, if there is any. BrØDsgaard et al (2017) find that in both SOEs and their publicly listed subsidiaries, administrative experience or political connections appear to increase the likelihood of promotion. However, in the case of central SOE subsidiaries, they find that leaders are more likely to be promoted based on financial performance.…”

Section: Contagion Effect Of Compensation Regulationmentioning

confidence: 83%

“…Since 2003 the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) of the State Council has been responsible for managing central SOEs. Each of these provincial-level governments has its own SASAC, which oversees provincial SOEs (local SOEs) (BrØDsgaard et al, 2017). Local SOEs are directly managed by the local government, and the State Council (the central government) generally does not manage local SOEs.…”

Section: Contagion Effect Of Compensation Regulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Contagion Effect of Compensation Regulation: Evidence From China

et al. 2021

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

To shed light on whether and how firms changed compensation practices in response to a shift in the environment in which they operated, we examine whether there is contagion effect of executive compensation regulation on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the emerging market of China. Specifically, we investigate whether firms not directly affected by the changing regulatory environment nonetheless changed executive compensation in response to the actions of the directly affected firms, which is called contagion effect. We further examine the specific contagion mechanisms and the economic consequences of regulation on compensation. We find that the regulation has a significant effect on compensation gap in central SOEs and a contagion effect on local SOEs but not for non-SOEs. Within SOEs, there is an intra-industry contagion effect of compensation regulation but not an intra-region effect. Further, central SOEs and local SOEs experience reduced firm performance after the compensation regulations, but not the non-SOEs; indicating that the compensation regulation does not have favorable economic consequences for both the directly affected central SOEs and the indirectly affected local SOEs.

show abstract

“…In contrast to the Edelman Trust Barometer that shows nearly three times as many Chinese citizens trust their government, one survey found, for example, that 'the average score on the scale measuring the overall perception of meritocracy is 48.20 in the U.S. but only 24.07 in China' (Xian and Reynolds 2017, 632). An empirical study of the career of 1250 top Chinese executives finds that their promotion is likely to be increased through their political connections as well as their administrative experience (Brødsgaard et al, 2017).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can meritocracy replace democracy? A conceptual framework

Warren

2020

Philosophy & Social Criticism

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Influenced by the example of China, a literature is emerging that advocates a modernized version of Confucian meritocracy, often as an alternative to liberal democracy and even democracy itself. We disagree with these arguments. A critical examination of the Chinese practices of meritocracy within the context of a regime that remains authoritarian is noticeably absent in the literature. This article addresses this gap and, in its findings, argues that political meritocracy, despite first appearances, does not offer a better alternative to liberal democracy. In contrast to many analyses, we do not view ‘meritocracy’ as a regime type but rather as an aspirational ideal that political leaders should have in merit their positions, relative to their functions. We develop a theoretical framework for comparing meritocratic features of regimes centred on a distinction between authoritarian meritocracy and democratic meritocracy. The framework brings into focus the ways in which the authoritarian features of the Chinese political systems undermine meritocratic claims and aspirations.

show abstract

China's SOE Executives: Drivers of or Obstacles to Reform?

Cited by 14 publications

References 10 publications

The Political Mobility of China's Central State-Owned Enterprise Leaders

The Political Mobility of China's Central State-Owned Enterprise Leaders

The Contagion Effect of Compensation Regulation: Evidence From China

Can meritocracy replace democracy? A conceptual framework

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About