China's Solution to Global Cyber Governance: Unpacking the Domestic Discourse of “Internet Sovereignty”

Abstract

Under Xi Jinping's leadership, China has actively promoted “Internet sovereignty” as a means to reshape the discourse and practices of global cyber governance. By analyzing Chinese‐language literature, this article unpacks the Chinese discourse of Internet sovereignty. Despite significant interest in promoting it as China's normative position on cyberspace, we find that Chinese formulations of Internet sovereignty are fragmented, diverse, and underdeveloped. There are substantial disagreements and uncertainty over what Internet sovereignty is and how it can be put into practice. This is principally due to the evolving pattern of Chinese policy formation, whereby political ideas are often not clearly defined when first proposed by Chinese leaders. This article argues that an underdeveloped domestic discourse of Internet sovereignty has significantly restricted China's capacity to provide alternative norms in global cyberspace. Appreciating this ambiguity, diversity, and, sometimes, inconsistency is vital to accurate understanding of transformations in global cyber governance occasioned by China's rise. Related Articles

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