China’s State-Directed Economy and the International Order

Che, Luyao; Che,

doi:10.1007/978-981-13-5838-8

Cited by 6 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…In SDEEs, governments are directly involved in market competition operating as business entities through State owned enterprises (SOE). Although state ownership is present in many countries, they exist mainly in natural monopoly industries to ensure basic needs of a nation and not for promoting economic growth as is the case in SDEEs (Che, 2019). The tight political connection between SOEs and the perceived government objectives associated with this relationship in the context of SDEEs underscores the stream of research into the role of ownership and governance structure in OFDI activities.…”

Section: State-directed Emerging Economies As a Typology Of Emerging mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Nevertheless, some studies (e.g. Che, 2019;Hu & Cui, 2014), indicate that although controlling owners have considerable influence over firms, other shareholders are not simply passive or non-contributory. In line with these arguments, our paper proposes that a more comprehensive approach to study the role of ownership structures in OFDI should duly take into consideration, the roles played by both controlling and essential non-controlling owners.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Ownership hybridization and FDI propensity: How firms from state-directed emerging economies can overcome institutional challenges in foreign direct investment.

Ogbuigwe¹,

Gao²,

Kahiya³

2020

Preprint

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The emergence of hybrid ownership structures and their OFDI activities is a critical but under-investigated phenomenon. We proffer that ‘state-directed emerging economies’ (SDEEs) - a unique typology of emerging economies – are largely driving the emergence of hybrid ownership structures. The direct and continuous government involvement in SDEE markets and the perception this economic system creates across a variety of host countries, present the dual hurdle of liability of “origin” and liability of foreignness in the OFDI of SDEEs firms. Our study proposes ownership hybridization (i.e. mixing state and private ownership) in the home market, as a mechanism through which SDEE firms counteract these unique institutional challenges in foreign investments. We argue that through hybridization, SDEEs firms benefit from the unique resources brought into the mixture by the different ownership logics and synergistically strengthen their ability to overcome institutional challenges in foreign investments. Nevertheless, benefits of hybridization are likely to vary in magnitude in relation to the degree of hybridization, suggesting an optimal blend of state and private ownership in a hybrid firm. In addition, we propose that hybridization effects are also contingent on top executives and their political connection, that engender resource and legitimacy implications. Our approach differs from existing studies that view home and host country institutional challenges in isolation. Rather, we recognize the inter-related effect of these institutional challenges and propose ownership hybridization as a strategy that simultaneously counteracts both.

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Section: State-directed Emerging Economies As a Typology Of Emerging mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ownership hybridization and FDI propensity: How firms from state-directed emerging economies can overcome institutional challenges in foreign direct investment.

Ogbuigwe¹,

Gao²,

Kahiya³

2020

Preprint

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“…The conventional categorization of ownership as either state or private is driven mainly by the prevalence of ownership concentration where controlling owners are noticeably state or private. Nevertheless, recent studies (e.g., Che, 2019;Aguilera, Capape & Santiso, 2016;Mariotti & Marzano, 2020) indicate that despite controlling owners having substantial control over firms, other non-controlling shareholders are not merely dormant or noncontributory to organizations strategic outcome. Hence, a more comprehensive approach to study the role of ownership structures in OFDI should deviate from the simplified categorization of ownership based on controlling state or private owners and consider the roles played by all investors irrespective of their controlling power.…”

Section: Research Background and Rationale Of The Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In emerging economies, SOEs are firms owned by the central or state government and their agencies (Stan, Peng, & Bruton, 2014) for engaging in commercial and political activities (Cuervo-Cazurra et al, 2014) and actively compete with domestic private owners and foreign investors (Hobdari et al, 2017). Although SOEs are present in developed countries, they exist mainly in natural monopoly industries to ensure the basic needs of a nation are met and not for promoting economic growth through domestic and international competition, as is the case with EEs (Che, 2019).…”

Section: Emerging Market Acquirers Ownership Structure and Cba Outcomementioning

confidence: 99%

“…As EMFs typically possess concentrated ownership structures where controlling owners are noticeably either state or private, extant research often does not pay attention to the interests and roles played by the non-controlling owners. Although controlling owners have considerable influence over firms, other non-controlling shareholders are not merely passive or noncontributory (Che, 2019;. Controlling and non-controlling owners confer varying degrees of institutional, financial, and governance implications that ultimately influence firms' strategic outcomes.…”

Section: Understanding the Importance Of Nature Of Hybridizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Hybrid ownership structures and cross-border acquisition completion of emerging market firms: An institutional and signalling theory perspective

Ogbuigwe¹

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Over the last decade, cross-border acquisitions (CBAs) have emerged as one of the most significant engines through which emerging market firms (EMFs) carry out foreign investments. Yet, emerging market acquirers (EMAs) terminate a significant percentage of initiated CBAs before completion. Compared to the 18 percent termination rate of CBAs involving acquirers from developed economies (DEs), CBAs by EMAs have a 33 percent termination rate. Scholars attribute the higher CBA termination by EMAs to the dual hurdle of 'liability of origin' and 'liability of foreignness' arising from direct government involvement and institutional voids in emerging economies. Although extant research provides in-depth insights into why EMAs have higher CBA termination rates than developed economies acquirers, they fall short in exploring how EMAs can navigate these challenges. Hence, in this study, I aim to investigate ownership based solutions to the institutional challenges affecting the CBA completion of EMAs. A striking phenomenon in the foreign investment of EMFs is that a firm's ownership matters. Pioneering ownership-based studies reveal that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private-owned enterprises (POEs) experience distinct interactions with home and host countries leading to diverse foreign investment challenges and strategies. Government regulatory discretion combined with capital market imperfection in emerging markets means that SOEs are privileged in accessing government support. In contrast, POEs lack direct government support and seek to establish and leverage political ties to survive. This need for sustained firm government relationships and the gradual pro-market reforms in many emerging economies catalyse hybrid ownership structures among EMFs where state and private owners coexist in one organization. However, this emergence of hybrid ownership structures and their implications for EMFs' foreign investment activities are under-investigated in the international business domain. Building on the new institutional theory and the signalling theory, I argue that hybrid ownership structures can act as signals through which external stakeholders evaluate and confer legitimacy on EMAs during the CBA process. My conceptualization emphasizes the mixture of unique resources brought into hybrid organizations by both SOEs and POEs. Accordingly, I assert that as hybrid organizations incorporate elements prescribed by both SOEs and POEs, they are likely to project at least partial appropriateness to a broader set of institutional referents. As a result, hybrid ownership structures confer legitimacy-enhancing benefits, resource-enhancing benefits, and operational autonomy benefits that position EMAs to simultaneously navigate the home and host institutional challenges in CBAs ultimately increasing the completion likelihood. In addition to proposing a direct effect of hybrid ownership on CBA completion, I develop novel varieties of hybrid ownership structures that categorize variations in the internal configurations of hybrid organizations as typology, degree, and nature of hybridization. I carry out further investigation on how the hybrid ownership effect might vary with these varieties of hybrid ownership structures. Subsequently, I identify top executives' political connection, target industry political sensitivity, and host country regulatory quality as contingences to the effect of hybrid ownership on CBA completion of EMAs. Analysing a dataset of 838 CBAs by Chinese firms between the years 2008 to 2017, the results from this study demonstrate that acquirers with hybrid ownership structures are more likely to complete CBAs than nonhybrid acquirers. Moreover, while the hybridization effect varied with the degree of hybridization, the results did not provide conclusive evidence for the nature of hybridization. The result also reveals that top executives' political connection and the host country regulatory quality present differing interactions with the hybrid ownership effect relative to the hybrid organization's typology. With these findings, I contribute to the literature on EMFs' CBA completion by demonstrating that hybrid ownership structures benefit from their different owners' resources to overcome challenges in CBAs. I also contribute to the conceptualization and implication of hybrid ownership for EMFs strategic outcomes. I find that the benefits of hybrid ownership differed with the controlling shareholder's identity and the degree of hybridization in a hybrid organization. Furthermore, by examining the boundary conditions of top executives' political connection, target industry political sensitivity, and host regulatory quality, I provide insights into how intra-organizational attributes and external factors shape the significance of ownershipstructures in EMFs foreign investment.

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The WTO’s Crisis: Between a Rock and a Hard Place

Bäumler

2020

European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2020

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China’s State-Directed Economy and the International Order

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

Ownership hybridization and FDI propensity: How firms from state-directed emerging economies can overcome institutional challenges in foreign direct investment.

Ownership hybridization and FDI propensity: How firms from state-directed emerging economies can overcome institutional challenges in foreign direct investment.

Hybrid ownership structures and cross-border acquisition completion of emerging market firms: An institutional and signalling theory perspective

The WTO’s Crisis: Between a Rock and a Hard Place

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