China, the EU, and the New Multipolarity

Abstract

The world within which the EU and China have to deal with each other is changing. The unipolar moment is definitely fading and slowly giving way to an international system characterized by multilayered and culturally diversified polarity. This development has far-reaching consequences for the EU-China relationship; the more so since the EU and China have distinctive identities and define their value preferences differently. China is no longer the developing country it once was and is becoming more assertive by the day. Beijing is at the head of the world's most successful economy and will weigh more and more heavily on global governance. 1 Three decades of impressive economic growth have boosted the self-confidence of the Chinese leaders significantly. In Beijing, the notion that China should start taking on an attitude befitting a great power is gaining ground. China is taking up ever more space within various multilateral organizations and is setting up diplomatic activities throughout the globe. Moreover, Beijing has become more active in setting up its own multilateral channels to further its national interests and own norms. China no longer considers itself an outsider that should crawl back into its shell and steer clear of a global political system dominated by the West. All this puts into question the EU's conditional policy towards China, which is based on the assumption that China can be socialized and persuaded to incorporate Europe's post-modern values. The way ahead seems to be for Europe to opt for a more pragmatic approach, which takes stock of the changes in the underlying power and identity relations between the EU and China. The analysis of this paper will be developed at three levels. First, it examines the changes in the structure of international politics. To what kind of structure are we evolving and where do China and the EU fit in? Second, it takes a closer look at the respective identities of China and the EU and explicates the major differences between them. Finally, this study appraises the implications of the emerging multilayered and culturally diversified polarity for the further development of the EU-China relationship.

Measuring Strategic Hedging Capability of Second-Tier States Under Unipolarity

“…Strategic hedging is a form behavior used by states wanting to improve their competitiveness while at the same time avoiding direct confrontation with main contenders. It is an appealing option for states facing uncertainty due to structural changes in the international system such as the present unipolarity giving way to a process of power diffusion (Geeraerts 2011). Under such conditions, strategic hedging becomes an attractive alternative for other strategies like balancing, bandwagoning, and buckpassing (see, Tessman 2012: 192;Salman et al 2015: 576-577).…”

China, the EU and multilateralism: the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

“…According to Xi Jinping, the global governance system should not be monopolized by a single country (Full Transcript: Interview with Chinese President 2015). The EU shares this opinion, and the unipolar moment seems to be fading and giving way to a new international system characterized by a multilayered and culturally diversified polarity (Geeraerts 2011). Both, China and the EU, use the terms 'multipolarity' and 'multilateralism' in their rhetoric (Scott 2013), and although they use these terms with different emphasis and timing, prospects for overcoming conceptual differences on global governance now appear to stand a greater chance than ever before (Ujvari 2017).…”

“…Of course, China and the EU diverge on some important points. EU's conditional policy towards China is based on the assumption that China can be persuaded to incorporate Europe's values, but Beijing has chosen to define its own path (Geeraerts 2011).…”

Kínai nagyhatalmiság. A Kínai Népköztársaság nagyhatalmi ambíciói, szerepvállalása, és partnerei a XXI. században

“…Számos magas színvonalú elemzés bizonyítja a téma kiemelkedő jelentőségét (lásd Kurlantzick [2007], Bergsten-Freeman-Lardy-Mitchell [2009], Halper [2010]). Az olyan jelentősebb bilaterális relációk, mint Kína és az Egyesült Államok (lásd Harding [1992], Sutter [2010], Halper [2010]), vagy Kína és az Unió viszonya (lásd Barysch-Grant-Leonard [2005], Holslag [2006], Geeraerts [2011]) kiemelt szerepet kapnak az észak-amerikai és nyugat-európai kutatásokban. E megközelítések többségének sajátossága, hogy az elemzés az aktuális folyamatokra és problémákra koncentrál, miközben a kapcsolatok átfogó, komplex bemutatása és a kínai saját-utasság kiemelése elmarad.…”

“…E nagyhatalom abban is eltér a többitől, hogy a kemény erő (hard power) eszközei helyett jellemzően a puha erő (soft power) eszközeit részesíti előnyben a más régiókkal, országokkal történő kapcsolatépítés során (lásd Ramo [2004], Kurlantzick [2007], Jordán [2010]). Nagyhatalmi ambíciói között tehát nem szerepel a világuralom, ellenben célja a további növekedés, célja, hogy Kínát megismertesse a világgal, eloszlassa a kínai (gazdasági) növekedéssel kapcsolatos félelmeket, megakadályozza az ilyen jellegű félelmekből, félreértésekből adódó Kína-ellenes szövetségek felsorakozását, és biztosítsa a status quo-t (lásd Bergsten-Freeman-Lardy-Mitchell [2009] Geeraerts már számol Kína világhatalmi státuszával, s egy kétrétegű multipoláris rendszerről ír, ahol az első réteget az Egyesült Államok, Kína, és esetleg az Unió alkotja, míg a második rétegen belül olyan regionális hatalmak találhatók, mint India, Brazília, Dél-Afrika, Oroszország, Japán, és a nagy nyugat-európai államok (Geeraerts [2011] pp. 58-62).…”