Chinese Industrial Espionage

Hannas, William C.; Mulvenon, James C.; Puglisi, Anna B.

doi:10.4324/9780203630174

Cited by 42 publications

(10 citation statements)

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“…27 The first of these insights-the need to treat counterintelligence as part of S&T threat awareness and mitigation-applies to China especially, whose technology depends heavily on foreign access and whose own collection posture reflects this dependency. 28 The commission's findings cited the U.S. government's less-than-stellar record addressing the issue of technology transfer: "Finding 1: The Commission found a limited effort by the IC to discern and exploit the strategic R&D-especially non-military R&D-intentions and capabilities of our adversaries, and to counter our adversaries' theft or purchase of U.S. technology."…”

Section: A 2013 Us Senate Commission On Intelligence Defined It Thimentioning

confidence: 99%

China’s STI Operations: Monitoring Foreign Science and Technology Through Open Sources

Hannas¹,

Chang²

2021

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Open source intelligence (OSINT) and science and technology intelligence (STI) are realized differently in the United States and China, China putting greater value on both. In the United States’ understanding, OSINT “enables” classified reporting, while in China it is the intelligence of first resort. This contrast extends to STI which has a lower priority in the U.S. system, whereas China and its top leaders personally lavish great attention on STI and rely on it for national decisions. Establishing a “National S&T Analysis Center” within the U.S. government could help to address these challenges.

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Section: A 2013 Us Senate Commission On Intelligence Defined It Thimentioning

confidence: 99%

China’s STI Operations: Monitoring Foreign Science and Technology Through Open Sources

Hannas¹,

Chang²

2021

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“…Instead, counter-transfer efforts should focus on more targeted programs such as investment screening, enhanced information security, and the prosecution of industrial espionage. 76 These programs should involve extensive partnerships with private sector actors, who possess much of the most sensitive AI technology and knowledge. They should also emphasize efforts aimed at prevention in addition to response 77 and be implemented with due attention to the risks of discriminatory impacts or perceptions.…”

Section: Priority 1: Target Immigration and Count-er-transfer Reformsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strengthening the U.S. AI Workforce

Zwetsloot¹,

Heston²,

Arnold³

2019

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“…While Hannas, Mulvenon and Puglisi focus on the period after 1978 in the USA, there are several similarities to the situation in the 1950s and 1960s in Europe, for example the fact that most Chinese students abroad studied engineering and sciences, and the fact that the Chinese government actively encouraged them to return to China. 44 However, the Chinese officials in Switzerland not only targeted Chinese students in Europe but also ethnic Chinese students like Taiwanese and Chinese Indonesians. The main reason for this was probably that there were simply not enough Chinese students in Europe.…”

Section: Expat Networkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…According to Hannas, Mulvenon and Puglisi, the Chinese government relied both on open sources like foreign scientific literature and overseas scholars, as well as on espionage in its efforts to modernize China. 72 China's industrial espionage in Cold War Europe can be put into two categories: firstly, technological information that could be used to copy Western production processes and products, and secondly, attempts to obtain embargo goods as well as scientific knowledge and know-how related to China's nuclear weapons program.…”

Section: Industrial Espionage and Intelligencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…This process, in Chinese called qingbaoxue ( 情报学 ), included the mining of scientific periodicals, government publications, conference proceedings and other publications, as well as scientific lectures and presentations. 87 The collection of open source intelligence seems to have been a crucial part of the Chinese diplomatic staff's activities in Switzerland. In 1958, Bernoulli wrote from Beijing: 'Tons of foreign scientific publications of all kinds (Swiss, German, French, American etc.)…”

Section: Industrial Espionage and Intelligencementioning

confidence: 99%

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‘White on the outside but red on the inside’: Switzerland and Chinese intelligence networks during the Cold War

Knüsel

2019

Cold War History

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Using previously classified archival records, this article discusses how Chinese diplomatic staff operated a variety of intelligence networks from Switzerland during the Cold War. As the site of China's first diplomatic mission in central Western Europe and the location of the United Nations' European headquarters, Switzerland was uniquely suited as China's intelligence hub in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s. Chinese officials established and ran a variety of European and even global intelligence networks out of Switzerland, whose members included Taiwanese diplomats; Chinese, Taiwanese, and Chinese Indonesian scientists and students; owners and staff of Chinese restaurants; Communists and communist sympathisers; and businessmen.network in Western Europe. 2 In the 1950s and 1960s, dozens -if not hundreds -of newspaper and magazines published sensational stories about Switzerland as the centre of China's espionage network in Europe with an army of spies at its disposal. For example, the Irish Independent stated: 'Red China's tentacles reach into Europe', describing the Chinese Embassy in Bern as 'a nucleus of intrigue and subversion' and the hub of China's global espionage network. 3 While the Swiss government felt that such stories were ridiculous and in no way realistic, it is quite curious that these rumours circulated for decades not only in Switzerland but all over world. 4 As a result, this article tries to reconstruct the reality behind the claims and takes a closer look at the role that Switzerland played in China's intelligence networks in the Cold War.Chinese intelligence during the Cold War has remained something of an academic wasteland until now. Moreover, as William C. Hannas, James Mulvenon and Anna B. Puglisi point out: 'much of the literature on Chinese intelligence is either outdated or fatally weakened by mythology an misinformation.' 5 Nicolas Eftimiades and Peter L. Mattis have both written publications on the structure and methods of Chinese intelligence operations against the USA, but their portrayals differ considerably from the findings of this article, not least because this article focuses on the context of Europe in the 1950s and 1960s. 6 Hannas, Mulvenon and Puglisi use Chinese official documents to discuss Chinese industrial espionage but they also tend to focus on the post Cold War-era. 7 All three publications criticise the traditional 'thousand grains of sand' view of Chinese intelligence, which claims that rather than using highly trained agents, China has employed large numbers of amateur agents. 8 This article, however, will show that in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, China employed both highly trained agents sent from Beijing as well as amateurs.While it is hardly surprising that there are no available Chinese sources on intelligence operations in Cold War Europe, almost all national archives in Europe, the USA,

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Chinese Industrial Espionage

Cited by 42 publications

References 0 publications

China’s STI Operations: Monitoring Foreign Science and Technology Through Open Sources

China’s STI Operations: Monitoring Foreign Science and Technology Through Open Sources

Strengthening the U.S. AI Workforce

‘White on the outside but red on the inside’: Switzerland and Chinese intelligence networks during the Cold War

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