Chinese Networks and Tariff Evasion

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. (2004) with Rauch and Trindade's (2002) study of Chinese trade networks. Chinese networks are known to act as trade catalysts by enforcing contracts and providing market information. As tariff evasion occurs outside the law, market information is scant and formal institutions inexistent, rendering networks the more important. We find robust evidence that Chinese networks, proxied by ethnic Chinese migrant populations, increase tariff evasion, i.e. the tariff semi-elasticity of Chinese missing imports. We suggest the effects takes place through matching of illicit-minded traders, identification of corrupt customs agents and enforcement of informal contracts. Terms of use: Documents in

Tariff Evasion, the Trade Gap, and Structural Trade

“…My tariff data comes from the TRAINS database. 16 I converted these from HS1996 to HS2002 product codes. Note that in the raw data, tariffs are often missing.…”

“…Other papers using product-level data include Rotunno and Vézina (2012), who use Chinese export and migration information to estimate the trade gap, and Bressan and Mattos (2022), who examine the link between non-tariff barriers and the trade gap for Brazil.…”

“…This can be found at https://www.ewf.uni-bayreuth.de/en/research/RTA-data/index. html 16. These can be found at https://databank.worldbank.org 17.…”

Tariff Evasion, the Trade Gap, and Structural Trade

“…In addition, if the tariff importer j imposes on product p from exporter i is missing in year t but is reported in the preceding or following year, then we repopulate the data with the minimum of those two values. 16 Following our model, we then control for the log of one plus the tariff where we expect a negative coefficient so that as the tariff increases, imports fall relative to exports and the trade gap moves into negative territories.…”

“…Similarly, Javorcik and Narciso (2008) analyze data on trade between Germany and ten Eastern European nations, with a follow-up paper (Javorcik and Narciso, 2017) considering fifteen WTO accession countries. Other papers using product-level data include Rotunno and Vézina (2012), who use Chinese export and migration information to estimate the trade gap, and Bressan and Mattos (2022), who examine the link between non-tariff barriers and the trade gap for Brazil.…”