Chipping in for a cleaner technology: Experimental evidence from a framed threshold public good game with students and artisanal miners

Isaza, Adrián Saldarriaga; Villegas-Palacio, Clara; Arango, Santiago

doi:10.1016/j.socec.2018.11.004

Cited by 1 publication

(7 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…In economic experiments, risk attitudes are usually assessed using the Holt and Laury (2002) lottery procedure, upon which Vollmer et al (2017) conclude that it is externally valid in assessing farmer's risk preferences. Saldarriaga-Isaza et al (2019) have found students to portray similar attitudes as compared to the artefactual sample of miners when assessed in risk attitudes, empathy and trust. Grüner et al (2022) vary the size of stakes in the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure and find near identical risk attitudes between agricultural students and farmers across all variations.…”

Section: Risk Attitudes and Cooperation: Students Versus Artefactual ...mentioning

confidence: 87%

“…For treatments that include a rebate rule, this changes. Coordination towards the Pareto-efficient outcome is observed in the field with contributions well above the threshold (Saldarriaga-Isaza et al, 2019).…”

Section: From Lab To Field: Generalizability Of Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…Moreover, information asymmetries due to unknown threshold levels, efficient effort levels, real transaction costs and heterogeneity in group composition, may provoke dynamics over time in the field context that are left unaccounted for in a lab setting. When extrapolating results from the lab to field situations, it is also shown that simple tasks seem to produce coherent behavioral patterns while behavior in complex tasks does not reproduce in the field (Saldarriaga-Isaza et al, 2019). Therefore, lab experiments with students should be understood as a "test bed" for behavioral tendencies of the general population (Saldarriaga-Isaza et al, 2019).…”

Section: From Lab To Field: Generalizability Of Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When extrapolating results from the lab to field situations, it is also shown that simple tasks seem to produce coherent behavioral patterns while behavior in complex tasks does not reproduce in the field (Saldarriaga-Isaza et al, 2019). Therefore, lab experiments with students should be understood as a "test bed" for behavioral tendencies of the general population (Saldarriaga-Isaza et al, 2019).…”

Section: From Lab To Field: Generalizability Of Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the specific case of TPGG experiments, studies on lab-to-field comparisons find that on average, an artefactual sample contributes more at group level across all treatment variations and is more successful in sustaining cooperation at or above the threshold than a student sample (punishment and external advisor with frame and miners in Saldarriaga-Isaza et al (2019), membership fee without frame and farmers in Bchir (2014), baseline without frame and nurses in Cadsby and Maynes (1998)). Sladarriaga-Isaza et al (2019) show that lab experiments on social dilemmas can be externally valid.…”

Section: From Lab To Field: Generalizability Of Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Can collective conditionality improve agri-environmental contracts? From lab to field experiments

Limbach,

Rozan,

Le Coent

et al. 2023

Rev Agric Food Environ Stud

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Individual subsidy payments that are conditional on a collective contribution threshold could provide a viable resolution to the insufficient and dispersed adoption of agri-environmental contracts aiming at attaining environmental quality targets. Indeed, in a decontextualized laboratory experiment based on a threshold public good game (TPGG), Le Coent et al. (2014) offer promising results regarding a conditional subsidy compared to an unconditional subsidy (i.e. the standard subsidy in existing agrienvironmental schemes). In this article, we propose to improve the external validity of these results by transposing this laboratory experiment to the "field" with farmers. To do so, we carry out a contextualized lab-in-field experiment with farmers by explicitly mentioning agri-environmental contracts and water quality. Our results show that farmers cooperate even more successfully than students and sustain more efficient outcomes over time. Considering a between-subject, both in the lab with students, and in the "lab-in-field" experiment with farmers, our results indicate that average group contributions are not significantly different under the conditional subsidy mechanism and under the unconditional subsidy mechanism. Indeed the conditional subsidy introduces two behavioural responses (perceived risks and initial beliefs on others' contributions) having opposite effects on contributions, and compensating each other. The conditional incentive mechanism thus shows promising potential as a tool for agri-environmental policy since it avoids the pay-for-nothing trap of the unconditional subsidy mechanism without discouraging contributions.

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