Chisholm’s Changing Conception of Ordinary Objects

Abstract

Roderick Chisholm changed his mind about ordinary objects. Circa 1973Circa -1976, his analysis of them required the positing of two kinds of entities-part-changing ens successiva and non-part-changing, non-scatterable primary objects. Th is view has been well noted and frequently discussed (e.g., recently in Gallois 1998 and Sider 2001). Less often treated is his later view of ordinary objects (1986)(1987)(1988)(1989), where the two kinds of posited entities change, from ens successiva to modes, and, while retaining primary objects, he now allows them to survive spatial scatter. Also (to my knowledge) not discussed is why he changed his mind. Th is paper is mostly intended to fi ll in these gaps, but I also give some additional reasons to prefer Chisholm's later view. Also, I discuss how mereological essentialism can be further defended by how it informs a theory of propertyinherence which steers between the excesses of the bare particularists and bundle theorists.

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