Chisholm's paradox and conditional oughts

Saint-Croix, Catharine; Thomason, Richmond H.

doi:10.1093/logcom/exw003

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 18 publications

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“…To saythatboth(c1)O(h)and(c5)O(Øt)aretruemeansthatinthedeonticallyideal possibleworldsJonesgoes helphisneighborsbutdoes not tellthemheiscoming in the ordering semantic framework.Although (c1) and (c5) are not logically inconsistentwitheachother,O(h∧Øt)doesnotholdintheCTDSituationgiven that(c1)and(c2)holdintheCTDSituation;accordingto(c1)and(c2),ideally Jonesissupposedtogohelphisneighborsandtellthemheiscoming. Prakken andSergot(1996;1997) 11. Inthesamevein,KolodnyandMacfarlane(2010)arguethattheinferencefromO(ψ/φ) andφtoO(ψ)isnotvalid,butquasi-validinthatitisareliableinferencewhenO(ψ/φ)andφare knowntobetrue.…”

Section: O(t∧øt)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Chisholm’s Paradox Revisited: Puzzles regarding Contrary-to-Duty Obligations and a Dynamic Solution

Won

2021

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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A contrary-to-duty obligation (CTD obligation) is a type of conditional obligation that tells us what to do when a primary duty is violated. Chisholm’s Paradox is one of the most famous deontic puzzles about CTD obligations. It is widely believed that Chisholm’s Paradox does not arise for ordering semantics, today’s orthodox semantics for modals and conditionals. In this paper, I propose a new puzzle, the CTD Trilemma, to show that ordering semantics still has difficulties in adequately representing natural reasoning with CTD obligations. I argue that to solve the CTD Trilemma a formal account must attend to two different functions played by ought-statements in our normative reasoning and discourse: ought-statements as normative rules and normative judgments. To formally capture this distinction I develop a new dynamic account of ought-statements and normative reasoning inspired by Frank Veltman’s update semantics for default reasoning. Finally, I show how my update semantics for normative reasoning provides a simple and elegant solution to the CTD Trilemma and explains seemingly inconsistent data about inferences using ought-statements in normative reasoning.

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Section: O(t∧øt)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Chisholm’s Paradox Revisited: Puzzles regarding Contrary-to-Duty Obligations and a Dynamic Solution

Won

2021

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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Moral Principles as Generics

Thakral¹

2023

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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I argue that moral principles involve the same sort of generalization as ordinary yet elusive generic generalizations in natural language such as ‘Tigers are striped’ or ‘Peppers are spicy’. A notable advantage of the generic view is that it simultaneously allows for pessimism and optimism about the role and status of moral principles in our lives. It provides a new perspective on the nature of moral principles on which principles are not apt for determining the moral status of particular actions while they may be apt, and even fundamental, to our acquisition of moral knowledge. A natural consequence of the view is variation among moral principles, with some regularly warranting exceptions and some appearing arguably exceptionless. I will also argue that this generic conception of moral principles has significant advantages, as a normative model of moral reasoning, over the view of moral principles as defaults advanced in recent years.

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Chisholm's paradox and conditional oughts

Cited by 2 publications

References 18 publications

Chisholm’s Paradox Revisited: Puzzles regarding Contrary-to-Duty Obligations and a Dynamic Solution

Chisholm’s Paradox Revisited: Puzzles regarding Contrary-to-Duty Obligations and a Dynamic Solution

Moral Principles as Generics

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