Choice, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities

Abstract

Is choice necessary for moral responsibility? And does choice imply alternative possibilities of some significant sort? This paper will relate these questions to the argument initiated by Harry Frankfurt that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility, and to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza's extension of that argument in terms of guidance control in a causally determined world. I argue that attending to Frankfurt's core conceptual distinction between the circumstances that make an action unavoidable and those that bring it about that the action is performed -a distinction emphasised in his recent restatement -provides a new route into an analysis of Frankfurt's argument by showing how it depends on a person's 'decision to act' involving the exercise of choice. The implicit reliance of Frankfurt's argument on this notion of choice, however, undermines his claim that the example of the counterfactual intervener strengthens the compatibilist case by providing a counter-example to the principle of alternative possibilities. I also argue that Frankfurt's reliance on the exercise of choice for moral responsibility is also evident in the Fischer/Ravizza argument, and that a close analysis of both arguments shows that such exercise of choice is not available if causal determinism is true.

What kinds of alternative possibilities are required of the folk concept(s) of choice?

“…Choice also plays a central role in the folk concept of free will (Baumeister, Sparks, Stillman, & Vohs, 2008;Coyne, 2012;Monroe, Dillon, & Malle, 2014;Monroe & Malle, 2010;Nahmias, 2009;Ogletree & Oberle, 2008;Shepard & Reuter, 2012;Turri, in press), as well as in philosophical analyses of free will (Biehl, 2008;Brown, 2006;Donagan, 1987;Freeman, 2000;Ginet, 1966;Holton, 2006;Kane, 1996;Murray & Nahmias, 2014;Unger, 2002;van Inwagen, 1983). The connection between choice and free will is so strong that simply recalling choices in one task leads to stronger endorsement of beliefs in free will in an ostensibly unrelated task (Feldman, Baumeister, & Wong, 2014).…”

On Abortion: Spontaneous and Induced.

“…She offers a clear and compelling account of why the main thrust of the doctrine-the claim there are cases in which it is unethical to intend a result but it is not unethical to bring about as (merely) foreseen. 25 She thought that virtues like benevolence, charity, justice, liberty, equality provide service to the human beings, but under what condition one has to apply these virtues is only decided through practical wisdom. These aspects of Philippa Foot's discussion make it useful to practitioners engaged in helping clients think through some of the many ethically and emotionally challenging situations that face us all, especially those cases in which considerations of justice and of kindness appear to pull in opposite directions.…”