Choosing Genocide: Economic Perspectives on the Disturbing Rationality of Race Murder

Abstract

An economic theory of genocide is presented with application to Rwanda-1994. The theory considers 'macro' conditions under which an authority group chooses genocide and 'micro' conditions that facilitate the spread of genocide. From the macro perspective, a bargaining model highlights four rational explanations for an authority's choice of genocide: prevention of loss of power, indivisibility, elimination of a persistent rival, and political bias. From the micro perspective, an evolutionary game model shows how supporters of genocide gain the upper hand in group dynamics over resisters and bystanders. The theory and application suggest that the conditions for genocide are not exceptional.Genocide, Conflict, Bargaining, Game Theory, Rwanda,

Genocidal risk and climate change: Africa in the twenty-first century

“…Further, because of the crucial role of intentionality, we usually observe genocide as a policy choice, more viable under certain conditions (particularly polarising forces), sometimes even being 'disturbingly rational'. 4 Consequently, while ideology plays an important role and psychopathic perpetrators have their place in genocide studies, most of the time people solve conflicts without turning to genocide, mainly because it simply does not make sense as a promising strategy from the viewpoint of potential perpetrators. Thus, the influence of climate change altering the framework in which political strategies are placed becomes increasingly relevant.…”

Mass Atrocities and Their Prevention

“…Acemoglu and Robinson (2001),,Verwimp (2004a), Persson (2009, 2011),Anderton (2010),Vargas (2011Vargas ( , 2016,Ott and Bae (2011), Rohner (2015, 2016),Ferguson, Michaelsen, and McDougal (2016).…”