Choosing Where to Fight: Do Social Networks Distinguish American ISIS Foreign Fighters from ISIS-Inspired Terrorists?

Abstract

Why did some American citizens choose to travel to fight in Syria and Iraq rather than engage in Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)-inspired terrorism in the United States? We conducted a social network analysis (SNA) on a sample ( n = 224) of extremists who either plotted ISIS-inspired attacks within the United States or attempted to travel to Syria or Iraq to join the group between 2013-2020. We test how network size, network interconnectedness, and the importance of trusted network members impact the choice of American ISIS offenders to travel or plot terrorist attacks. Our results show that Americans were more likely to choose to travel to fight when they had access to large, dense networks that were embedded with trusted associates. Those without access to similar networks abandoned their preferences for foreign fighting and instead plotted attacks within the United States. The findings provide pertinent policy implications for countering violent extremism.

Interoperability and Targeted Attacks on Terrorist Organizations Using Intelligent Tools from Network Science

“…Our previously published research on four real-world terrorist networks revealed the distinct social roles of individuals in terrorist organizations [38] and uncovered successfully some early signs of impending terrorist attacks [39]. The fusion of social network analysis and machine learning methods provides valuable insights into the structure, operation, and dynamics of terrorist networks [37,[40][41][42][43][44][45][46][47].…”

“…Concerning network attacks related to terrorist organizations, three key papers were found in the relevant literature, namely: (a) [41] where a model for assessing network robustness with non-real data was studied, (b) [46] where attacks on the air transportation network of a terrorist organization were studied, and (c) [47] where attacks on the online social network of ISIS foreign fighters was studied.…”

Extremists of a feather flock together? Community structures, transitivity, and patterns of homophily in the US Islamist co-offending network

“…By contrast, jihadists who rely on online communities to form relationships may not be connected to trusted associates who can accurately judge the character of potential recruits. This is especially concerning in the US context, where individuals looking to form relationships with fellow extremists online often unknowingly connect with undercover law enforcement [ 56 ]. Finally, extremists are more likely to form co-offending ties if they share affinities for groups or movements with similar values and goals.…”