Churchill and Germany

The Weaver Street bombing in Belfast 1922: violence, politics and memory

“…82 Sir James Craig, the prime minister of Northern Ireland, provided an extensive response presenting a particular view of the ongoing violence in Belfast, including the bombing. He began by stating that 'the greatest tension has existed in Belfast since the kidnapping of loyalists and the murderous attack on the police at Clones station on Saturday last', 83 a passage which was echoed almost verbatim in the same day's Belfast Telegraph' editorial. He enumerated attacks that had occurred in Belfast since 12 February, which he viewed as the starting point of the outbreak.…”

“…He wrote: 'regrettable incidents occurred that day; including the indiscriminate throwing of bombs over a wall into Weaver Street, a Sinn Fein area, which resulted in the death of two children and the wounding of fourteen others'. 87 It is impossible to ascertain Craig's source of information about the bombing, but his representation was at odds with publicly available information that morning. While some newspapers reported three 88 or four 89 bombs thrown into Weaver Street, major Belfast newspapers reported only one bomb thrown and they specifically painted Weaver Street as an idyllic playground subjected to a sudden bomb attack.…”

An Historical Examination of International Coalitions.

“…The certain knowledge that no single power had any hope of defeating him, was the glue that finally overcame the mistrust of the coalition partners long enough to make a successful campaign. 37 Next, after years of half-hearted cooperation and piecemeal defeat, the partners finally achieved a general agreement on unified strategic goals and both strategic and operational planning. 38 At one level, Metternich successfully argued "the principle that the power that puts 300,000 men into the field in the first power and all others only auxiliaries."…”

Churchill and the Germans

“…'Still', he added, 'I was very glad to see them where they were' . 4 Those at dinner in 10 Downing Street on 11 November 1918 had also agreed on 'the impossibility of re-building Europe without [the Germans'] help', and from this perception Churchill never deviated, not least because of his increasing worry about Bolshevism. His general perception of European relationships reflected traditional British ideas of the balance of power, and of the extreme danger to the Western democracies of any German alliance with Russia, since in 1919 Germany itself was in the throes of revolution, with the red flag flying in Munich, sailors mutinying in Kiel and Rosa Luxembourg abroad in the former Reich, the ultimate horror of a GermanRussian Communist front presented itself.…”

“…. ' 5 Quite apart from Russia though, Churchill was urging that generous terms be offered to defeated Germany, on grounds that came quite close to those proposed by Keynes in his The Economic Consequences of the Peace. As he put it in 1921, he was 'anxious to see friendship grow up and the hatred of the war die between Britain and Germany.…”