Citizen Attitudes on Politicians’ Pay: Trust Issues Are Not Solved by Delegation

Abstract

Citizens are generally opposed to politicians receiving a high pay. We investigate the degree to which this aversion is moderated by citizens’ individual-level trust in politicians and whether institutional delegation can moderate the reactions to proposed changes in politicians’ pay. Using a survey experiment, we confirm that trust in politicians is a key predictor of attitudes regarding their pay. Distrust toward politicians seems to matter much more than general attitudes on income inequality when citizens form opinions on politicians’ pay. Furthermore, citizens’ aversion to high pay for politicians is affected by institutional delegation, but such delegation only lessen the opposition to pay raises modestly, leaving most citizens firmly against pay raises for politicians. Finally, while citizens’ trust in politicians matters greatly for their attitudes regarding politicians pay, proposed changes in politicians’ pay do not conversely affect citizen’s perceptions of the politicians.

Reward or Punishment? The Distribution of Life-Cycle Returns to Political Office

“…In general, a large majority of the population thinks that politicians are paid too much and they are against increasing their salary even mores (Pedersen and Pedersen, 2020;Pedersen, Hansen and Pedersen, 2022). However, the combination of high short-term returns to office across the income distribution and the fact that, over time, the cumulative returns to office are not universally positive underscores the importance of taking a nuanced and detailed view on the returns to office.…”

The effects of transparency regulation on political trust and perceived corruption: Evidence from a survey experiment

“…These allow for a comparative analysis of the attitudes toward these political actors, which instead would not been feasible had we focused on other organizations or institutions considered in transparency research, such as the court system or police forces (Grimmelikhuijsen & Klijn, 2015;Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2015). 4 Despite these similarities between political parties, MPs, and business interest groups, we argue that transparency has different effects on the formation of attitudes toward these three actors due to the different weight individuals assign when evaluating each actor (Fisher et al, 2010;Pedersen & Pedersen, 2020;Valgarðsson et al, 2021;Whiteley et al, 2016). For example, while citizens are overly concerned about political parties pursuing special rather than public interests (Ansolabehere et al, 2005;Primo & Milyo, 2006), research suggests that individuals rely mostly on performance evaluations (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2008;van Erkel & van der Meer, 2016), and issue or ideological proximity (André & Depauw, 2017;Hetherington & Rudolph, 2008) when assigning trust to political parties.…”

“…We expect this to also apply to the case of transparency of politicians' financial assets. While politicians' messages of probity play a role in trust and other evaluations (Faulkner et al, 2015; Hetherington & Rudolph, 2008; Pedersen & Pedersen, 2020), these are often less important than policy or issue proximity, performance, and authenticity (Fisher et al, 2010; Keele, 2007; Valgarðsson et al, 2021). “Getting things done” and focusing on improving voters' (financial) position is assumed to be a priority in an individual's evaluation of elected representatives.…”

“…People are still “amazingly attuned, hypersensitive even, to the possibility that decision makers will attempt to improve themselves at the expense of everyone else” (Hibbing & Theiss‐Morse, 2002: 85). However, research unveiling such hypersensitivity mostly concerns instances when politicians are (or appear to) seeking private gains at the public's cost (Chauchard et al, 2019; McAllister, 2000; Mortimore, 1995; Pedersen & Pedersen, 2020; Vargas & Schlutz, 2016). Even in these extreme circumstances, democratic accountability studies show that voters can be quite forgiving of politicians' and political parties' unethical behavior, also when their actions are tainted by scandals (Basinger, 2013; Chang et al, 2010).…”