Existing research on compliance failures by individuals and businesses focuses primarily on information and incentive problems. This article develops a comprehensive framework for analyzing barriers to compliance, giving particular attention to resource and autonomy barriers, heterogeneity of the target population, multiple barriers to compliance, and problems that arise when a complex and ongoing set of actions is require to be "in compliance." How governments react to compliance failures is heavily influenced by the social construction and political power of target populations. The propositions developed in the article are tested against the cases of the Swedish individual account pension system and welfare reform in the United States.Many policies can only achieve their objectives if a broad array of ordinary citizens, corporations, or other actors "comply" with those policies, that is, behave in ways that are consistent with the enunciated objectives of the policy. Financing government requires that citizens and corporations pay their taxes. Lowering the emission of greenhouse gases may require increased use of public transit, the purchase of more fuel-efficient vehicles, and a variety other actions by millions of people. Indeed, for some programs, like bans on smoking in public places, changing the behavior of some target group of citizens is the whole point of the policy. Other policies-fair labor standards, pollution laws, and of course tax lawsrequire compliant behavior from businesses (see, e.g., Gray and Shadbegian 2005;Gunningham and Kagan 2005;Mendeloff and Gray 2005).There are substantial and diverse literatures on why individuals and businesses do or do not comply with public policies. These literatures span the fields of political science, economics, law, and psychology (see, e.g.,