Citizens’ trust in public and political institutions in Nepal

Abstract

This article examines patterns of popular trust in political and public institutions in Nepal. We ask to what extent such trust is linked, on one hand, to citizens' social and political identities, and on the other hand, to citizens' perceptions of institutional performance. Our findings demonstrate that trust in public institutions varies extensively. Trust is high for a number of professional institutions, such as schools and hospitals. It is also quite high for local government institutions. Trust in the parliament and the government is much lower. Furthermore, the analysis reveals a weak relationship between institutional trust and identity variables. Demographic and social characteristics of participants, such as caste, and religious and political affiliations, have little significance in explaining the level of citizens' trust in political and public institutions. Such trust primarily depends upon how citizens assess the performance of these institutions. Hence, patterns of institutional trust depend on how participants evaluate the current macro-political situation in Nepal, whether recent political changes are judged to have gone in the right direction. In a more general and comparative perspective our findings from Nepal fit with a performance-based theory of institutional trust, while, to a large extent, they disconfirm identity-based explanations.

The Hearts and Minds in Conflict and Peace

“…Cassar, Grosjean, and Whitt (2013), Cuesta and Alda (2012), Luca and Verpoorten (2015), and Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti (2013), yet there is only a handful of studies devoted to the topic of trust in government. These studies found that satisfaction with government services is a strong predictor of trust in government (Askvik, Jamil, and Dhakal, 2011;Hutchison and Johnson, 2011;Sacks and Larizza, 2012;Stoyan et al, 2016), a finding consistent with studies in developed countries.…”

“…Second, most of the previous research has only relied on basic estimation methods such as OLS and multilevel analysis, which are incapable of addressing the empirical challenges of endogeneity and selection bias (e.g. see Askvik, Jamil, andDhakal (2011), Juan andPierskalla (2016), Hutchison and Johnson (2011), Sacks and Larizza (2012), and Stoyan et al (2016). This article engages these challenges by applying the instrumental variable method and Heckman's selection model to deal with the potential endogeneity bias and the data attrition problem commonly encountered in studies using survey data.…”

Rebuilding Government Legitimacy in Post-Conflict Societies: Case Studies of Nepal and Afghanistan

“…Distribution is unlimited historical lineage of power, such as the Church or Kings; and legal-rational authority, based on rationally created rules and laws. In line with this formulation, Nepal's post-conflict statebuilding period-from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement reached in 2006 until the present-can be characterised as a shift from traditional authority to legal-rational authority, as the state transforms from a Hindu monarchy with power structures based on caste hierarchy, patriarchy and instrumental dominion into a secular democratic republic (see Askvik et al, 2011). In fact, this transition echoes Weber's predicted order of the modernising development of states from charismatic to traditional to legal-rational authority (considered to be the most advanced).…”

Trusting the Enemy: Confidence in the State Among Ex-Combatants

“…37 Anti-social capital is the result of patterns of voluntary association and group membership (strong in-group bonding) that erode rather than build trust across social networks (and excludes the possibility of bridging), leading to reduced cooperation or undesired social outcomes. Levi cites an extreme case: "Timothy McVeigh and other co-conspirators in the Oklahoma City bombing [in 1995] were members of a bowling league; this is a case where it may have Dhakal 2011. 32 Putnam 19931995;Coleman 1988;Fukuyama 1996;Woolcock 1998.…”

“…48 World Bank Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit 2002, 3. 49 Askvik, Jamil, and Nath Dhakal 2011;Coleman 1994;Dasgupta 1988;Hetherington 1998;Hutchison and Johnson 2011;Levi 1998;Rotberg 2004; Van de Walle and Bouckaert 2003. demonstration that the state will consistently meet its commitments and uphold a high standard of behavior, is one of the most fundamental determinants of trust. 50 Similarly, Raiser argues that the state can build trust by exercising moral leadership.…”