Civil Society Democratising Global Governance? Potentials and Limitations of “Counter-Democracy”

Abstract

A major aspect of global interdependencies during the last two decades has been the intensified interactions between international organizations (IOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs). In this paper, we propose a new way of analysing the potential of CSO inclusion to democratise global governance. The aim is to explore the possibility for CSOs to function as a form of counter-democratic force. This approach contrasts with earlier research that has tended to focus on participation, voice or representation when evaluating IO-CSO interaction from a democratisation perspective. Using Pierre Rosanvallon's term, we argue that counter-democratic actors organise distrust against power-holders, pressuring them to strengthen accountability. Counter-democracy is manifested in the institutions, agents and functions that are committed to overseeing ruling institutions, expressing mistrust and channelling dissent. Importantly, counterdemocracy is not contrary to democracy, but a vital and perennial aspect of it. Our argument is that Rosanvallon's concept of counter-democracy can help us understand how the monitoring activities of CSOs may restrain the power of IOs and make them more responsible which in turn can be related to democratic qualities of global governance. However, we maintain that not all activities of transnational CSOs have counter-democratic qualities. To examine if and how a specific CSO might serve as a democratising force in global governance, we suggest that the actors and their activities should be scrutinised according to an analytical framework centred on the concepts of power-resources, ideational foundations and activities. Empirically, we investigate three carefully selected cases of CSOs that perform monitoring activities in a global governance context: the Corporate Europe Observatory, the NGO forum on the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and NGO Monitor.

The Global Development Formula

“…In a similar fashion, the UN needs to become more flexible, effective, and operative [60] to provide a wider response to institutional interdependency [61], in which public administration bodies can no longer be confined simply to a discussion of government agencies [62]. This complex interplay between global and local levels also requires the acknowledgment that even at the global level, the dynamics of power and contestation are inseparable from everyday material life [63].…”

“…Ultimately, global governance should be a more effective vehicle to provide positive human development globally [65] by ensuring the effective implementation of "smart" global policies [66]. This implies, among others, a sound interaction with civil society organizations [62], and anticipating existing global tensions [67], the support for sound administrative capacity [68], the implementation of transnational [69] and global spatial planning for a green and sustainable future [70]. In addition, fundamental is the need for a common language that everyone understands (and can read and write), used in all fundamental official documents.…”

Legitimation and Delegitimation in Global Governance

“…2013), and a growing body of scholarship is analyzing how GGIs have sought to improve their legitimacy through institutional and administrative reforms, for example, by opening up to civil society and other non-state actors and the general public (Grigorescu 2007;. While most previous scholarship focuses on such self-legitimating institutional practices by GGIs, recent research shows that institutional practices may also serve as delegitimation in relation to other institutions and actors, as in the case of the establishment of new competing institutions that challenge the dominance of established GGIs (Uhlin 2019). Moreover, scholars have begun to explore behavioral (de)legitimation in terms of civil society mobilization and protest against GGIs .…”

“…Unlike most previous research, it also includes less familiar GGIs (see chapters in Zaum ed. 2013;Uhlin 2019; for studies of other less well-known GGIs) and offers a broader comparative case selection of nongovernmental and hybrid GGIs than previous studies of the politics of (de)legitimation (e.g., Bernstein and Cashore 2007;Dingwerth 2007). Moreover, extant research has tended to focus on either practices, justifications, or audiences of (de)legitimation, whereas this volume offers a combined analysis of these three central aspects of the politics of (de)legitimation, enabling us to provide a more comprehensive account of how processes of legitimation and delegitimation are constituted.…”

A Cosmopolitan Reading of Modern Monetary Theory

“…Cosmopolitanism should not mean rule by "cosmopolitan" elites, but inclusive rule by the global citizenry as a whole. Civil society actors play a crucial role in ensuring that supranational arrangements remain de facto democratically accountable(Kalm, Strömbom, and Uhlin 2019).37 As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, the prospects of supranational exercise of monetary sovereignty depend on how widely MMT can reshape mainstream economic thought. Despite promising signs of growing interest, much remains to be done on this front.…”