1990
DOI: 10.1177/002200949002500406
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Civil War and Foreign Intervention in Greece: 1946-49

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Cited by 34 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…In the Greek civil war (1947-49), such a construct was observed where insurgents enjoyed little social support despite colocation. 40 This kind of construct affords prospects of human intelligence that can be the basis for the kinetic application of air power. However, even intelligence-based kinetic applications cannot be without prohibitive political costs due to the high possibility of collateral damage.…”
Section: Airpower Strategies To Combat Non-traditional Security Threatsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the Greek civil war (1947-49), such a construct was observed where insurgents enjoyed little social support despite colocation. 40 This kind of construct affords prospects of human intelligence that can be the basis for the kinetic application of air power. However, even intelligence-based kinetic applications cannot be without prohibitive political costs due to the high possibility of collateral damage.…”
Section: Airpower Strategies To Combat Non-traditional Security Threatsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Di awal periode Perang Dingin rakyat Yunani tercabik-cabik oleh perang saudara. Akibat dari perang saudara, rakyat Yunani kehilangan sepuluh persen dari total jumlah penduduknya -lebih buruk dari jumlah korban karena Perang Dunia II yang menyentuh angka delapan persen dari jumlah penduduk (Nachmani, 1990 (Nachmani, 1990).…”
Section: Perang Sipil Yunani 1946-1949unclassified
“…'In the battle between two regular armies, the "guerrillas" no longer had the advantage.' 65 It would not be unfair to say that by late 1947 the GDA was no longer a 'pure' guerrilla force, but effectively a conventional one. Assessing whether an insurgent force has acquired sufficient weaponry, cadre, and training to take on national forces is critical but difficult.…”
Section: The Greek Casementioning
confidence: 99%