Civil War Generals in Defeat (review)

Gordon, Lesley J.

doi:10.1353/cwh.1999.0119

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Therefore, Powell and the military strongly recommended to Bush that he end the war after 100 hours, even though Hussein was still in power and the Republican Guard, the elite force that helped him retain control of Iraq, was still largely intact. 98 The lesson of the Vietnam analogy, to give the military a free hand to conduct military operations, had been dangerously extended to allow the military to determine when to end the war and how to shape the peace.…”

Section: Lessons From History and The Ceasefirementioning

confidence: 99%

Hitler's Shadow: Historical Analogies and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait

Macdonald¹

2002

Diplomacy & Statecraft

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Section: Lessons From History and The Ceasefirementioning

confidence: 99%

Hitler's Shadow: Historical Analogies and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait

Macdonald¹

2002

Diplomacy & Statecraft

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“…26 Perhaps most contentious of all was the perceived level of support granted to the land component by the JFACC: by the end of January 1991, less than twelve percent of Armynominated targets had been struck. 27 Despite the friction, the resounding victory of coalition forces in ODS cemented the JFACC construct-and the ATO's AirLand pedigree-as a proven model. To be sure, the air "campaign" was a tremendous success, and even President Bush credited much of the coalition's triumph to the value of airpower.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Stigma of Failure in Organizations

Ferrer¹,

Dew²

2008

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Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 11-06-2007 SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENTDistribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy. ABSTRACTThe JFACC construct, as it exists today, is, at best, narrowly viable in a twenty-first century context, and is, at least, structurally and procedurally cumbersome, as well as doctrinally inconsistent with real-world practice. The JFACC is, simply, the JFC's delegated commander of air operations. However, the concept encompasses a wider context, to include: the air component command authority or the individual who wields it, JFACC doctrine, the JFACC staff and its organizational structure, and the processes that constitute the various JFACC command, control, and staff functions. Primarily, this paper focuses on JFACC doctrine, process, and to a lesser extent, structure. Through these lenses, a historical, evolutionary profile of the JFACC concept is developed explaining the JFACC's doctrinal pedigree. Following that analysis, the JFACC is examined critically in the light of recent, current and foreseeable twenty-first century conflict. That critique will validate the conclusion that a gap exists between current JFACC doctrine and practice, using as a focal point the doctrinal tenet of "centralized control and decentralized execution." The processes that characterize both the Air Tasking Order (ATO) development and the Time-Sensitive Target (TST) engagement will serve as research examples. The discussion finishes with recommendations for further investigation into viable solutions or alternatives to the imperfect status quo. ii AbstractThe JFACC construct, as it exists today, is, at best, narrowly viable in a twenty-first century context, and is, at least, structurally and pr...

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Civil War Generals in Defeat (review)

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

Hitler's Shadow: Historical Analogies and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait

Hitler's Shadow: Historical Analogies and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait

The Stigma of Failure in Organizations

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