Civilian Praetorianism and Military Shirking During Constitutional Crises in Latin America

Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War, an elected civilian leader in Latin America is more likely to be displaced from office prior to the end of his constitutional term by mass mobilization than by a military coup. As Arturo Valenzuela has observed, thirteen of the fifteen nonconstitutional transfers of power in the region between 1990 and 2004 have been the result of civilian coups rather than military actions.1 This phenomenon has occurred in Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador, while attempts in Peru and Venezuela have failed. Civilian coups are not confined only to Latin America; they have occurred in the Philippines, where "people power" displaced both dictators and elected presidents; in Ukraine with the "Orange" Revolution; and in Georgia with the "Rose" Revolution. In each case, a civilian elected leader was ejected from power by the mass action of civilian, rather than military, sectors of society.This article focuses on military responses (or the lack thereof) to mass protests against elected governments during moments of constitutional crisis in democratic states. These crises occur when opposition forces decide that merely changing government policy is not enough; that what is required is a change in government itself. This may involve violent or nonviolent mechanisms, but the universe of cases examined here is delimited by the opposition's goals-changing governments outside the normal democratic processes established by the constitution rather than altering government policy. The cases draw on the Latin American experience with democratization both because the third wave of democracy struck the region earlier than most and because states in the region have had a long experience with military intervention in politics.At first glance what appears to have changed about contemporary politics in Latin America is the unusual lack of military intervention in moments of social contestation that might have produced a coup d'état in previous eras. Samuel Huntington once argued that in praetorian societies, students riot, workers strike, and militaries coup.

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