Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism

Abstract

In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in Ethical Intuitionism, whose core claim is that normal ethical agents can and do have non‐inferentially justified first‐order ethical beliefs. Although this is the standard formulation, there are two senses in which it is importantly incomplete. Firstly, ethical intuitionism claims that there are non‐inferentially justified ethical beliefs, but there is a worrying lack of consensus in the ethical literature as to what non‐inferentially justified belief is. Secondly, it has been overlooked that there are plausibly different types of non‐inferential justification, and that accounting for the existence of a specific sort of non‐inferential justification is crucial for any adequate ethical intuitionist epistemology. In this context, it is the purpose of this paper to provide an account of non‐inferentially justified belief which is superior to extant accounts, and, to give a refined statement of the core claim of ethical intuitionism which focuses on the type of non‐inferential justification vital for a plausible intuitionist epistemology. Finally, it will be shown that the clarifications made in this paper make it far from obvious that two intuitionist accounts, which have received much recent attention, make good on intuitionism's core claim.

A Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism and the Problem of Cognitive Penetrability

“…The upshot here is that if this popular empirical model is correct, at least for evaluative experiences, then the kind of cognitive penetration involved in evaluative experiences provides no threat to AEI after all. See, e.g., Cullison 2010, McBrayer 2010a, 2010b, Roeser 2011, Audi 2010, 2013, and Cowan 2013aand Cowan , 2013b See, e.g., Strugeon 2002, Huemer 2008, especially 4.4, Cullison 2010, McBrayer 2010a, 2010b Värynen 2008, forthcoming, Huemer 2008, 4.4. Defenses of the claim that evaluative properties can figure in the contents of experience can be found in McBrayer 2010a, 2010b, Roeser 2011 This objection is pressed most forcefully by Cowan 2013b, forthcoming, and Väyrynen forthcoming.…”

“…I take this conception of epistemic independence from Cowan : 10—though of course epistemic independence is a pervasive notion in foundationalist epistemology. My formulation of EI is different from Cowan's, but I believe it captures the same idea.…”

Which Moral Properties Are Eligible for Perceptual Awareness?

“…The most prominent distinctions concern what exactly moral perception comes to, and how exactly it This distinction comes from Werner (forthcoming, Section 1). 15 Cowan (2015). Not everyone accepts the inference from causal dependence to epistemic dependence-most notably, Phenomenal Conservatives reject this move.…”

“…This view is sometimes called "a posteriori ethical intuitionism" (see, e.g. Väyrynen 2008, Werner forthcoming) or "perceptual intuitionism" (Cowan 2015). I avoid this terminology to avoid confusion, as Chudnoff's view makes overt use of intuition talk as an alternative to perceptual experience.…”

“…For one response, see Werner (forthcoming). 5 Audi (2013), Cowan (2015). 6 For the distinction between 'pure' and 'impure' moral perception, see Werner (forthcoming, section 1), as well as below.…”