Classical cryptographic protocols in a quantum world

Hallgren, Sean; Smith, Adam; Song, Fang

doi:10.1142/s0219749915500288

Cited by 23 publications

(40 citation statements)

References 55 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Some progress toward identifying sufficient conditions under which classical protocols are also quantum immune has been made by Unruh [Unr10] and Hallgren et al [HSS11]. Unruh shows that any scheme that is statistically secure in Cannetti's universal composition (UC) framework [Can01] against classical adversaries is also statistically secure against quantum adversaries.…”

Section: Theorem 2 (Informalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantum-Secure Message Authentication Codes

Boneh

Zhandry

2013

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. We construct the first Message Authentication Codes (MACs) that are existentially unforgeable against a quantum chosen message attack. These chosen message attacks model a quantum adversary's ability to obtain the MAC on a superposition of messages of its choice. We begin by showing that a quantum secure PRF is sufficient for constructing a quantum secure MAC, a fact that is considerably harder to prove than its classical analogue. Next, we show that a variant of Carter-Wegman MACs can be proven to be quantum secure. Unlike the classical settings, we present an attack showing that a pair-wise independent hash family is insufficient to construct a quantum secure one-time MAC, but we prove that a four-wise independent family is sufficient for one-time security.

show abstract

Section: Theorem 2 (Informalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantum-Secure Message Authentication Codes

Boneh

Zhandry

2013

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…To illustrate the need for a composable analysis of relativistic quantum cryptography, we focus on bit commitment protocols, which have attracted interest in recent years [6][7][8][9]. Bit commitment is a crucial cryptographic primitive, from which we can construct oblivious transfer 6 [10], multi-party computation (see footnote 5) [10], coin flipping [12], and zero-knowledge proofs [13,14].…”

Section: Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A concrete example is a physical box containing some optical elements (like beam-splitters) and connected to optical fiber cables: each wire may carry several messages at different times (or even in a superposition of different times). A single instance of a message is modelled as a quantum state in the joint Hilbert space   Ä ( ) l 2 , where  is the Hilbert space of the actual classical/quantum message,  is a partially ordered set that defines an ordering on the space of messages and  ( ) l 2 is the sequence space with bounded two-norm 14 . In the simple cases where a quantum state…”

Section: Cryptography In Relativistic Settings: the Causal Boxes Frammentioning

confidence: 99%

Composable security in relativistic quantum cryptography

2019

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Relativistic protocols have been proposed to overcome certain impossibility results in classical and quantum cryptography. In such a setting, one takes the location of honest players into account, and uses the signalling limit given by the speed of light to constraint the abilities of dishonest agents. However, composing such protocols with each other to construct new cryptographic resources is known to be insecure in some cases. To make general statements about such constructions, a composable framework for modelling cryptographic security in Minkowski space is required. Here, we introduce a framework for performing such a modular security analysis of classical and quantum cryptographic schemes in Minkowski space. As an application, we show that (1) fair and unbiased coin flipping can be constructed from a simple resource called channel with delay; (2) biased coin flipping, bit commitment and channel with delay through any classical, quantum or post-quantum relativistic protocols are all impossible without further setup assumptions; (3) it is impossible to securely increase the delay of a channel, given several short-delay channels as ingredients. Results (1) and (3) imply in particular the non-composability of existing relativistic bit commitment and coin flipping protocols.

show abstract

“…With the aim of exploring the set of achievable cryptographic tasks in post-quantum world, the closest work to ours is ( [12]), which provides existence theorems. It studies the existence of two-party protocols which are UC-secure in the presence of quantum adversaries.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

On Classical Cryptographic Protocols in Post-Quantum World

Vajda¹

2017

IJCNIS

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract-In post-quantum approach, we consider classical (non-quantum) protocols and primitives which are run by honest parties on classical computers and our aim is to keep their security in an environment where the adversary can rely on quantum computers [3]. In particular, even a harder goal is set by requiring provable security guaranties in a concurrent running environment as we aim computational UC-security.Unruh [16] conjectured that classical arguments of computational UC-security remain usable in a postquantum world as long as the underlying computational UC-secure primitives are also computationally quantum UC-secure. Our proposed technique (full factorization) aims at reducing the original protocol into a statisticallysecure protocol by turning the protocol into a hybrid one where all cryptographic primitives are substituted by appropriate ideal functionalities. The considered set of primitives consists of secret key and public key encryption as well as digital signature. This way and by applying the Unruh's Quantum Lifting Theorem as well as the Quantum Universal Composition Theorem we gain a computationally quantum UC-secure protocol from a classical UC-secure protocol. We consider quantum standard-security, where the adversary can send only classical inputs to honest algorithms, i.e. honest machines cannot receive quantum superposition of inputs If we add also the practical need of efficiency our example is the class of protocols built from symmetric key primitives. A practical (fast) implementation could be based on AES encryption algorithm with appropriate key size as long as we live with the wide belief that this algorithm is secure against a quantum adversary.

show abstract

Classical cryptographic protocols in a quantum world

Cited by 23 publications

References 55 publications

Quantum-Secure Message Authentication Codes

Quantum-Secure Message Authentication Codes

Composable security in relativistic quantum cryptography

On Classical Cryptographic Protocols in Post-Quantum World

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About